党组织嵌入对国有企业绩效的影响研究——基于高管超额权力限制和非效率投资抑制的视角  

A Study on the Impact of Communist Party Organization Embedding on thePerformance of State-owned Enterprises: From the Perspective of ExecutiveExcessive Power Restrictions and Inefficient Investment Suppression

作　　者：靳琳琳 任广乾[2] 景曼 王靖 JIN Linlin;REN Guangqian;JING Man;WANG Jing(Business School,Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics,Zhengzhou 450015,China;Business School,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001 China;School of Public Affairs,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州航空工业管理学院商学院,河南郑州450015 [2]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001 [3]浙江大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310058

出　　处：《经济经纬》2024年第6期107-120,共14页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(22AGL017);中国博士后科学基金第74批面上资助项目(2023M741072);河南省软科学研究项目(242400411206,242400411107);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72471210);河南省高校哲学社会科学应用研究重大项目(2023-YYZD-27,2025-YYZD-15);河南省重点研发专项(241111210200)。

摘　　要：基于国有企业基层党组织建设视角,以2013—2022年中国沪深A股上市国有企业为研究样本,检验了党组织嵌入对国有企业绩效的影响以及高管超额权力限制和非效率投资抑制的中介作用。研究结果表明:党组织嵌入治理结构能够显著提升国有企业绩效,且党组织嵌入对国有企业绩效的提升作用在董事会、监事会和高管层之间存在差异,党组织嵌入董事会对国有企业绩效产生的改善作用最大,其次是党组织嵌入高管层,最后是党组织嵌入监事层。机制分析表明,党组织嵌入通过限制高管超额权力和抑制非效率投资行为提升国有企业绩效。异质性分析发现,相较于中央企业、垄断性国有企业和内部控制质量好的国有企业,党组织嵌入对地方国有企业、竞争性国有企业和内部控制质量差的国有企业绩效提升作用更为显著。研究结论不仅有助于深入理解党组织参与国有企业治理的经济后果,还为持续完善中国特色现代企业制度提供了新思路。From the perspective of grassroots party organization construction in state-owned enterprises,taking China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed state-owned enterprises from 2013 to 2022 as research samples,this paper examines the impact of party organization embedding on the performance of state-owned enterprises and the mediating role of executive excess power restrictions and inefficient investment suppression.The results show that the embedding of party organizations in the governance structure can significantly improve the performance of state-owned enterprises,and the improvement effect on the performance of state-owned enterprises is different among the board of directors,the board of supervisors and the Executive level.Embedding party organizations into the board of directors has the greatest effect on improving the performance of state-owned enterprises,followed by the executive board,and finally the board of supervisors.Mechanism analysis indicates that party organization embedding improves the performance of state-owned enterprises by restricting executive excessive power and curbing inefficient investment behavior.Heterogeneous analysis manifests that compared with central enterprises,monopolistic state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises with good internal control quality,party organization embedding has a more significant effect on improving the performance of local state-owned enterprises,competitive state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises with poor internal control quality.The conclusions not only help us deeply understand the economic consequences of party organizations’participation in state-owned enterprise governance,but also provide new ideas for the government to continue to improve the modern enterprise system with China characteristics.

关 键 词：党组织参与治理 超额权力限制 非效率投资 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]