药品集采政策与药企研发行为  

Centralized Drug Procurement Policy and R&D Behavior of Pharmaceutical Companies

作　　者：王少飞[1,2] 张勇 冯伟忠 WANG Shao-fei;ZHANG Yong;FENG Wei-zhong(School of Business,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200083,China;Accounting and Finance Research Institute,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200083,China)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学商学院,上海200083 [2]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200083

出　　处：《经济问题》2025年第1期91-99,共9页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“债券违约处置的地区性信用风险及预警体系探究”(21BJL083)。

摘　　要：药品集采政策会加剧医药行业竞争,从而影响医药企业的研发投入。基于药品集采前后三年医药企业的研发专利样本,针对药品集采政策对药企研发行为影响的回归结果表明,集采政策的实施会增加医药企业的研发专利数量,但医药企业所面临的转换成本和集采的预期市场收益,会影响医药企业的研发行为,并进一步影响医药企业的创新效率。因此,要降低医药行业的制度成本,加强医药企业之间的分工合作和并购重组,提升医药企业的创新效率,从而加快完善药品集中采购制度和推动健康中国的政策落实。The centralized drug procurement policy is set to intensify competition among pharmaceutical companies,resulting in increased investment in research and development(R&D).An analysis of R&D patent samples from pharmaceutical firms three years before and after the policy's implementation reveals that it positively impacts the number of patents.However,the switching costs faced by these companies and the anticipated market returns from procurement significantly influence their R&D activities,ultimately affecting their innovation efficiency.To address these challenges,it is crucial to further reduce institutional costs within the pharmaceutical sector,enhance collaboration and mergers among companies,and improve innovation efficiency.This will help accelerate the refinement of the centralized drug procurement system and support the effective implementation of health policies in China.

关 键 词：药品集采 研发专利 转换成本 预期市场收益 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]