考虑政府补贴和失望规避的低碳供应链动态策略  

The Dynamic Strategy for Low-carbon Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidies and Disappointment Aversion

作　　者：于迪 YU Di(College of Economics,Bohai University,Jinzhou 121013,China)

机构地区：[1]渤海大学经济学院,辽宁锦州121013

出　　处：《物流科技》2025年第1期145-147,160,共4页Logistics Sci Tech

基　　金：辽宁省社科联2024年度辽宁省经济社会发展研究课题项目“低碳供应链动态策略及协调机制研究”(2024lslqnrckt-001);辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目“参考碳排放效应下双渠道供应链最优策略及协调机制微分博弈研究”(L22BGL005)。

摘　　要：在消费者低碳意识逐步提升和政府积极推动节能减排的背景下,构建关于制造商和竞争性零售商进行独立决策的微分模型。在模型的构建中,考虑了制造商和零售商的失望规避特征和政府补贴,得到如下结论:(1)失望规避会降低制造商的减排努力,但不影响竞争性零售商的低碳宣传水平。减排量、商誉以及利润等均与失望规避程度负相关;(2)零售商之间的竞争程度会对其利润产生抑制作用;(3)消费者低碳偏好会进一步促进制造商的减排行为,带来减排量的提升。In the context of consumers with low-carbon preferences and government subsidies,this study constructs a differential game model about manufacturers and retailers.In the construction of the model,the effects of disappointment aversion and government subsidies on decision-making are considered.The following conclusions are obtained:(1)Disappointment aversion reduces the emission reduction efforts of manufacturers,but does not affect the level of low-carbon promotion of competitive retailers.Emission reduction,goodwill,and profit are all negatively related to the level of disappointment aversion;(2)The level of competition among retailers has a dampening effect on their profits;(3)Consumer low-carbon preference further promotes manufacturers'abatement behavior,bringing about an increase in emission reductions.

关 键 词：低碳供应链 失望规避 政府补贴 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]