复合官僚制:中国政府治理的微观基础  

Mixed Bureaucracy:Governing China's Micro-foundation

作　　者：张璋[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《公共管理与政策评论》2015年第4期6-14,共9页Public Administration and Policy Review

基　　金：中国人民大学"统筹推进世界一流大学和一流学科建设"专项经费的支持(项目批准号:ISXNL001)

摘　　要：基于特有的治理传统和政治体制,中国政府组织逐渐形成的并不是韦伯笔下的以法理为基础的西方那样的现代官僚制,而是融价值理性和工具理性为一体的复合官僚制。这一强激励制度,以民主集中制和统一的公务员制度为基础,以干部考核、教育培训和行政监察为管理手段,既让中国政府官员有了强烈的执行动机,也让中国政府拥有了强大的执行力。它在一定程度上避免了西方文官弱激励制度带来的绩效动机弱、因循守旧、形式主义和实际上不负责任的弊端,但也存在着对官员的政治要求和业务要求相互影响的内在矛盾。如何处理这个矛盾,成为中国政府官员激励制度设计的核心问题。在实践中,中国政府根据客观需要,不断调整对官员的政治要求和业务要求的相对权重,以此让官员的行动方向始终与政府治理目标保持一致。改革开放后,中国政府官员努力发展经济的动机和现今反腐阶段提出的对官员的政治素质要求,就是这种调整的具体反应。Under the influence of governance tradition and its political system,China has developed a unique model of bureaucracy,which is different from Weberian Modern Bureaucracy that emphasizes the dichotomy of politics and administration.China's unique model,may be named as Mixed Bureaucracy,builds an innate tension in between politics and administration—it emphasizes both values and instrumental effectiveness.By adjusting the emphasis at different times and for different task environment,the system drives into its civil servants and cadres a powerful incentive to act and comply.This is exactly what makes China's development a success.It prevents China from suffering mediocre performance,low incentive,over-conservative action,formalism,and irresponsibility that are of typical cases in western countries.However,this system has its own weakness.It exerts high pressure for the central leaders who are in control of both the political orientation and instrument robustness to make correct decisions all the time,or else the consequences can be significantly detrimental as well.For further improving China' s governance system,more research efforts are desired challenges.

关 键 词：现代官僚制 复合官僚制 激励制度 绩效考核 政府治理 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]