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作 者:王晶[1] 周俊利 司凤山[1] WANG Jing;ZHOU Junli;SI Fengshan(School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu 233030,China;不详)
机构地区:[1]安徽财经大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽蚌埠233030
出 处:《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》2024年第6期902-909,916,共9页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基 金:安徽省高校科研计划资助项目(2022AH050589,2024AH052067);安徽财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目(ACYC2023024);安徽省哲学社会科学规划资助项目(AHSKYY2023D009)。
摘 要:基于由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的生鲜农产品供应链,建立以供应商为领导者的Stackelberg模型,考虑供应链不同成员的公平关切行为,对比分析政府不补贴、政府补贴供应商和政府补贴零售商3种模型下的最优决策,并通过数值仿真分析政府补贴和公平关切对最优决策的影响。结果表明:政府补贴对生鲜供应链的发展具有较明显的推动作用,但力度不宜过大,因为消费者需承担更高的市场价格;政府应根据市场实际情况选择补贴对象,补贴零售商有利于提高农产品新鲜度,补贴供应商则有利于提高供应链总利润;政府不补贴和补贴供应商时,生鲜农产品的批发价、零售价、冷链服务水平、营销努力水平和需求量均随零售商公平关切行为的增强而下降;政府补贴零售商时,供应商公平关切行为会造成冷链服务水平、营销努力水平和需求量的下降,但批发价格和零售价会上升。Based on a fresh agricultural product supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer,a Stackelberg model with the supplier as the leader was established.Considering the fairness concerns of different members of the supply chain,the optimal decisions under three models of government non-subsidy,government subsidized supplier and government subsidized retailer were compared and analyzed.Based on this,the effects of government subsidies as well as equity concerns on optimal decisions were analyzed through numerical simulation.The results of the study showed that government subsidies have a more obvious role in promoting the development of the fresh food supply chain,but the intensity should not be too large,because consumers need to bear higher market prices;The government should choose the target of subsidies according to the actual market situation,subsidizing retailers is more conducive to improving the freshness of agricultural products,while subsidizing suppliers is conducive to improving the total profit of the supply chain;Wholesale prices,retail prices,cold chain service levels,marketing effort levels,and demand for fresh produce all decline with increased retailer fairness concern behavior when the government does not subsidize and subsidizes suppliers;When governments subsidize retailers,supplier fairness concerns act to cause a decrease in cold chain service levels,marketing effort levels and demand,but an increase in wholesale and retail prices.
关 键 词:冷链物流 政府补贴 STACKELBERG博弈 生鲜品供应链 公平关切
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