作为道德衡量标准的“功利”——从休谟到约翰·穆勒的英国功利主义批判研究  

“Utility”as the Moral Criterion:A Critical Study of British Utilitarianism from Hume to J.S.Mill

作　　者：汤用彤 赵建永(翻译)[2] Tang Yongtong;Zhao Jianyong

机构地区：[1]不详 [2]天津社会科学院哲学研究所国学与跨文化研究中心,天津300191

出　　处：《天府新论》2025年第1期75-82,157,共9页New Horizons from Tianfu

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“汤用彤与20世纪宗教学研究新证”(编号:11CZJ001)。

摘　　要：英国伦理学自寇德华斯、霍布斯以后,道德的来源和评判标准成为两大焦点问题。本文系统考察哈奇森、休谟、斯密、塔科、边沁、穆勒等人的功利主义思想及其关于道德评判标准问题的解答困境,并围绕困扰功利论者的三个重要问题展开:一、功利主义如何解决不同快乐之间的冲突?二、作为评判标准,“快乐”是否足以用于解决个体和社会间的利益冲突?三、作为道德标准,“快乐”能否有充分的“约束力”促使人们合乎道德地行动?尽管功利主义未能就上述问题提出圆满的解决方案,但它的理论并不会因此而失去意义。每种学说各有其优势与不足,功利主义的原则虽切近实际,但并非全是真理,我们对之应审慎取舍。Since Cudworth and Hobbes,British ethics has focused on two issues,namely,the source of morality and the standard of judgment.This paper systematically examines the utilitarianism thoughts of Hut⁃cheson,Hume,Smith,Tucker,Bantham,Mill,and others,and the dilemma of their answers to the question of moral judgment standards,and focuses on three important questions that puzzle utilitarians:1.Is“pleas⁃ure”an adequate criterion of our choice between actions,connected with distinctly different pleasure?2.Is“pleasure”an adequate criterion of settling the conflict between individual and social interests?3.Can“pleasure”,when taken as the moral criterion,have sufficient“obligatory force”to compel us to act morally?Al⁃though utilitarianism failed to propose a satisfactory solution to the above problems,its theory will not lose its significance.Each theory has its own advantages and disadvantages.Although the principle of utilitarianism is close to reality,it is not all truth.We should choose it carefully.

关 键 词：功利主义 道德 衡量标准 快乐 约束力 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]