元伦理学中的“直觉”问题  

The Issue of Intuition in Metaethics

作　　者：葛四友 Ge Siyou

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《中国社会科学》2024年第12期123-141,202,共20页Social Sciences in China

摘　　要：元伦理学在过去一个多世纪中取得显著进展,但也催生了许多相互冲突的理论流派。以往研究侧重于从论证角度理解和解决理论分歧,较少关注直觉在理论辩护中的作用。关于直觉首先需要澄清两个问题。其一,人们更重视的是哪些核心直觉,体现科学主义精神的直觉,还是反映反道德虚无主义的直觉?其二,直觉在理论辩护中发挥何种功能,它为理论提供结论性辩护、初定辩护还是初步辩护?研究者在元伦理学早期普遍认为直觉提供的是结论性辩护,倚重某一类直觉的理论通常会排斥或忽视另一类直觉,两者处于对立状态;进入中期开始认为直觉提供了初定辩护,试图通过某一类直觉来解释甚至消解另一类直觉,两类直觉进入相互理解的过程;到了后期则认为直觉提供初步辩护,逐渐展现出两类直觉的相容性,并进入相互接纳阶段。Previous metaethics research has predominantly focused on understanding and resolving theoretical disagreements from an argumentative standpoint,with less attention given to the role of intuition in theoretical justification.Two critical issues must be clarified with respect to intuition.First,which core intuitions are most valued:those that reflect the spirit of scientism,or those that embody anti-moral nihilism?Second,what role does intuition play in theoretical justification:does it provide conclusive justification,prima facie justification,or pro tanto justification?In the early stages of metaethical inquiry,intuition was largely regarded as offering conclusive justification.Theories grounded in one type of intuition often rejected or ignored the other,placing them in opposition.By the mid-stage,intuition was treated as offering prima facie justification,with efforts to explain or resolve one type of intuition through the other,thereby initiating a process of mutual understanding.In the later stages,intuitions came to be seen as providing pro tanto justification,progressively revealing their compatibility and culminating in a stage of mutual acceptance.

关 键 词：元伦理学 直觉 结论性辩护 初步辩护 初定辩护 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]