监管部门奖惩下企业CSR报告质量及相关者行为分析  

Analysis of Corporate CSR Reporting Quality and Related Participants’Behaviors under the Regulator Reward and Punishment Mechanism

作　　者：张超[1] 薛缘杰 ZHANG Chao;XUE Yuanjie(School of Finance,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu,Anhui,233030)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学金融学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《成都大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第1期35-53,共19页Journal of Chengdu University (Social Sciences)

摘　　要：企业高质量发布社会责任报告关乎人民身体健康、城乡环境改善和经济高质量发展,是实现“双碳”目标的重要环节,但近年来频繁发生的企业披露低质量社会责任报告事件,揭露了审计合谋、监管缺失等问题。本文引入监管强度系数,构建“企业—审计机构—监管部门”三方演化博弈模型,分析各参与方的演化稳定性,探讨不同要素对三方策略选择的影响,并进一步研究了三方博弈系统中均衡点的稳定性。本文发现:(1)提高监管强度系数与企业和审计机构的奖罚力度,减小企业和审计机构不同策略之间的成本差有助于规范企业和审计机构的行为;(2)但过高的监管强度系数、对企业和审计机构过大的奖罚数额不仅会加重监管部门负担,还会遏制监管部门监管积极性;(3)监管部门可以通过增加对审计机构的奖罚力度来减小企业选择“低质量发布”的概率;(4)上级机构对监管部门消极监管的失职问责力度会影响企业和审计机构的策略选择。最后,通过Matlab R2023b进行仿真分析,对企业和审计机构的监管提出相应的政策建议。High-quality Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR)reports are crucial to people's health,urban and rural environment improvement,and high-quality economic development.It is an important part of realizing the"double carbon"goal,but in recent years there have been frequent incidents of enterprises disclosing low-quality social responsibility reports,exposing problems such as audit collusion and lack of supervision.In this paper regulatory intensity coefficients are introduced,and a three-party evolutionary game model of"enterprise-audit institution-regulatory authority"is constructed,in order to analyze the evolutionary stability of each participant and explore the influence of different elements on the strategic choices of the three parties,and the stability of the equilibrium point in the three-party game system is further studied.This paper finds that:(1)The behavior of enterprises and audit institutions can be better regulated by increasing the regulatory intensity factor and the rewards and penalties for enterprises and audit institutions to reduce the cost differential between different strategies of enterprises and audit institutions;(2)However,over-intensity factor of regulation and excessive amount of rewards and penalties for enterprises and audit institutions not only increase the burden on the regulator,but also decrease the regulatory incentives of regulator;(3)The regulator can reduce the probability of enterprises choosing"low-quality"releases by increasing the rewards and penalties for the audit institutions;(4)The intensity of accountability of higher-level institutions for the failure of regulators to negatively regulate affects the strategy choices of enterprises and audit institutions.Finally,the simulation analysis is conducted by Matlab R2023b,and corresponding policy recommendations are made for the regulation of enterprises and audit institutions.

关 键 词：企业社会责任报告 合谋审计 监管强度 三方演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] D630.9[经济管理—国民经济]