从质形论到目的论——亚里士多德对灵魂概念的定义策略  

From Hylomorphism to Teleology:Aristotle's Definition Strategy of the Concept of Soul

作　　者：赵奇 Zhao Qi

机构地区：[1]东北大学马克思主义学院哲学系

出　　处：《哲学门》2024年第2期223-236,共14页Beida Journal of Philosophy

基　　金：国家留学基金项目“挪威互换奖学金”(项目号202306080017)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：亚里士多德对灵魂概念的定义在《论灵魂》中占据至关重要的地位,可以通过三种方式来定义灵魂概念:首先,灵魂是潜在具有生命的自然身体之形式,其次,灵魂是潜在具有生命的自然身体之第一现实,最后,灵魂是有器官的身体之第一现实。然而,这三种定义是并列关系,还是层次递进关系?约翰森的看法可提供一种解释方案,但他对三种定义的论述并不详尽,并且未贯彻灵身之间的非纯粹原则。从亚里士多德的论证逻辑来看,这三种定义呈现为层级递进的关系,即从质形论深入到目的论,而目的论定义作为灵魂定义的结论。Aristotle's definition of the concept of soul occupies a vital position in De Anima,the concept of soul can be defined in three ways:Firstly,the soul is a substance as the form of a natural body which has life in potentiality;Secondly,the soul is the first actuality of a natural body which has life in potentiality;Finally,the soul is the first actuality of an organic natural body.However,are these three definitions parallel or hierarchical?Johansen's view can provide an explanation,but his discussion on the three definitions is not exhaustive,and the principle of impurity between the soul and body has not been implemented.From Aristotle's argumentation logic,the three definitions of soul reflect hierarchical relationship,namely from hylomorphism to teleology,and the definition of teleology as a conclusion of soul's definition.

关 键 词：亚里士多德 灵魂 形式 现实 器官 

分 类 号：B502.233[哲学宗教—外国哲学]