Central Bank Digital Currencies and Their Use by Tax Administrations  

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:Jeffrey Owens Anastasiya Piakarskaya Joao Ochoa 

机构地区:[1]WU Global Tax Policy Center Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law Vienna University of Economics and Business(WU) [2]Research Associate Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law Vienna University of Economics and Business(WU)。

出  处:《Belt and Road Initiative Tax Journal》2024年第2期53-63,共11页“一带一路”税收(英文)

摘  要:Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) may offer transformativeopportunities for tax policy and administration, particularly if features like program-mability and enhanced transparency are implemented. Automating fiscal transferscould streamline government payments and reduce administrative burdens, whileprogrammable tax enforcement could simplify compliance and recovery processes.Limited privacy capabilities may help address tax evasion and llicit financial flowsby creating a transparent and traceable audit trail. However, implementing CBDCsinvolves balancing these benefits with challenges such as privacy protection anddata security. Wide adoption requires a secure and trusted digital currency system that safeguards personal and financial information, preventing unauthorized access and cyberat-tacks. Additionally, CBDCS present risks like disintermediation and“digital dollarization”, whichrequires careful design to mitigate. Cross-border use of CBDCS could reduce transaction costsand promote economic integration among Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) jurisdictions, but coordi-nation on standards is essential to prevent regulatory competition. CBDCs have the potential toreshape financial and tax systems, being thus important to explore their design and governance.

关 键 词:Central Bank Digital Currencies(CBDCs) Tax policy and compliance Transparen-cy PROGRAMMABILITY 

分 类 号:R73[医药卫生—肿瘤]

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象