外部强监管与独立董事职能发挥  

Strong External Regulation and the Supervision Function of Independent Directors

作　　者：罗进辉[1] 林宁 巫奕龙 LUO Jin-hui;LIN Ning;WU Yi-ong(School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian,361005,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《经济管理》2024年第11期168-188,共21页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“新时代构建亲清政商关系研究”(22ZDA045)。

摘　　要：随着资本市场强监管时代和注册制的到来,如何发挥各类主体特别是强化独立董事的监督职能引起了社会各界的高度重视。基于此,本文以2005—2021年沪深两市A股上市公司独立董事为研究样本,实证检验了上市公司监管处罚对独立董事异议行为的潜在影响。研究发现,上市公司被监管处罚后,公司内未受处罚的独立董事更可能发表异议意见,表明外部监管处罚具有正向溢出效应。路径检验发现,上市公司监管处罚主要通过提高独立董事的声誉风险而非法律风险发挥作用。进一步,相较于兼任和长任期独董,监管处罚的溢出效应主要体现在任职于被处罚公司和短任期独董中。此外,在公司违规年份的任职经历会强化溢出效应,而且相关溢出效应主要体现在前期没有发表异议行为的独立董事群体。最后,在分析师关注度和机构投资者持股比例较低的公司中,上市公司监管处罚的溢出效应更强,政府监管与市场监督间存在替代关系。本文不仅丰富了监管处罚溢出效应和独立董事异议行为领域的文献,而且对于当前强监管背景下上市公司独立董事制度的改革实践具有重要启示。With the emergence of a strong regulatory era in the capital market and the implementation of a comprehensive registration-based IPO system,there has been considerable attention from various sectors of society on how to leverage the supervisory effectiveness of regulatory bodies,particularly independent directors.In light of the current backdrop,the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Association for Public Companies have promulgated the “Measures for the Administration of Independent Directors of Listed Companies” and the “Guidelines for the Performance of Duties by Independent Directors of Listed Companies(Revised in 2024)” on August 42023,and November 52024,respectively.These documents aim to establish policy frameworks that enhance the supervisory roles of independent directors.Despite of these efforts,the suboptimal performance of independent directors in China should be largely attributed to the minimal legal risks they face,among the regulatory penalties imposed on listed companies,a negligible proportion extends to the individual level of independent directors. Against this context,this study endeavors to investigate whether corporate regulatory penalties can stimulate independent directors to diligently execute their supervisory responsibilities by impacting their reputation,given the low legal risks associated with their role.Therefore,this study focuses on independent directors of A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2021,and empirically investigates the potential influence of corporate regulatory penalties on dissenting behavior by independent directors.This study finds that after a listed company received a regulatory penalty,independent directors who were not subject to regulatory penalties are more likely to express dissenting opinions and generate significant positive spillover effects. Mechanism analysis demonstrates that the regulatory penalty on listed companies strengthen the positive spillover effect on dissenting behavior of independent directors mainly through the

关 键 词：监管处罚 溢出效应 独立董事 声誉机制 异议意见 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]