基于信息优势与技术优势的企业竞争策略:一个非对称双寡头博弈模型  

Firms' Competing Strategies with Informational Advantage and Technological Advantage: An Asymmetric Duopoly Model

作　　者：韩海鹏 李明志[1] 郑捷 HAN Haipeng;LI Mingzhi;ZHENG Jie(School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University;Center for Economic Research,Shandong University)

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,100084 [2]山东大学经济研究院,250100

出　　处：《经济研究》2024年第12期77-94,共18页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71873074、72073080);清华大学自主科研计划(2022THZWJC01);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2024MG004)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：随着数字经济的快速发展,企业能够获取越来越多的消费者信息,并具备对消费者实行差异化定价从而提升自身利润的能力,这体现为企业的信息优势。同时,企业可以致力于技术创新,通过降低生产成本从而增加自身利润,这体现为企业的技术优势。本文通过构建Hotelling双寡头模型,分析了竞争环境下分别具有信息优势和技术优势的寡头企业如何进行博弈互动,及其对市场结构和社会福利的影响。本文的结论表明:(1)站在企业的角度,技术优势的效应具有连续性,任何细微的技术提升对企业提升利润都有利无弊;信息优势的效应具有突变性,只有当信息优势足够大时,企业才有动机选择发挥信息优势。(2)站在社会规制者的角度,发挥信息优势的企业需要同时拥有足够大的技术优势才能提升社会福利。企业如果只拥有单方面的信息优势,实行差异化定价对社会弊大于利。本文进一步讨论当每家企业的可行策略发生变化时的市场均衡,发现在一定条件下政府可以通过适当的规制政策引导企业进行技术创新,从而提升社会福利。本文的结论不仅有助于深入理解数字经济市场中企业的竞争策略,还能够为政府促进数字经济健康有序发展提供理论指导和政策建议。In the information age, the rapid development of the digital economy firms has had a significant impact on global social and economic conditions. Within the digital economy market, there are typically two types of firms: the first type boasts consumer information and can implement price discrimination;the second type has an advantage in technological innovation and lower production costs. The competition between these two types of firms has been referred to as the “virtual versus real competition”, in which the “virtual” side represents the informational advantage, while the “real” side refers to the technological advantage. This paper, based on a duopoly competition model, explores the issue of asym-metric competition between these two types of firms and analyzes the effects of informational and technological advantages on market structure and social welfare.This paper constructs a Hotelling duopoly competition model, in which the comparison between informational advantage and technological advantage is concretized as the competition between a firm with consumer information and a firm with a lower marginal cost. We examine the case of two-dimensional asymmetry, where firm 1 has a technological advantage and firm 2 has an informational advantage. In stage 1, firm 2 decides whether to collect consumer information.In stage 2, depending on the decision by firm 2 in the previous stage, either firms 1 and 2 independently decide their own uniform price, or firm 1 first sets its uniform price and firm 2 then adopts a differential pricing strategy by utilizing its informational advantage. In the last stage, every consumer chooses which firm to purchase from.We show that(1) for firms, the effect of technological advantage is “continuous”, meaning that improvements in technology inevitably lead to increased profits. In contrast, the effect of informational advantage is “discontinuous”,meaning that a firm will only collect consumer information and implement price discrimination when the informational adv

关 键 词：差别定价 不对称竞争 消费者信息 技术优势 信息优势 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]