国有股东委派董事能否改善民营企业信息不对称?  

Can the Participation of State-owned Directors in Governance Alleviate Information Asymmetry in Private Enterprises?

作　　者：钱爱民[1] 肖亦忱 吴春天 QIAN Aimin;XIAO Yichen;WU Chuntian(Business School,University of International Business and Economics;Business School,Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029 [2]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《金融研究》2024年第8期132-149,共18页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(72332002);财政部“会计名家培养工程”项目(财会[2019]19号)的资助。

摘　　要：改善信息环境和提升信息披露质量是注册制改革的核心,对于资本市场健康发展意义重大。市场主体中民营企业的信息披露质量较低,信息不对称问题较为严重。在此背景下,本文研究国有股东委派董事对缓解民营企业信息不对称的影响。研究发现:国有股东参与民营企业董事会治理能够有效缓解信息不对称问题,尤其在中小股东治理参与度低、媒体监督力度弱以及市场竞争程度低的民营企业中效果更为显著。进一步分析表明,国有董事通过监督效应和资源效应发挥信息治理作用,且具有财务或法律背景及相对较为年轻的董事影响更为明显。经济后果的检验显示,国有股东委派董事后,民营企业的信息不对称缓解,有助于提升分析师预测的准确度和企业投资效率。本文从董事会多元混合治理的视角对民营企业信息不对称进行了深入探讨,为提升公司信息披露质量和资本市场资源配置效率提供了理论参考。Improving the information disclosure environment and enhancing the quality of information disclosure are the core of registration system reform and crucial to the capital market's healthy development.Despite this reform emphasizes high-quality information disclosure,issues of information falsification stll exist.Thus,alongside external regulation,strengthening internal corporate governance is also essential.The Party and the state attach great importance to the high-quality development of private enterprises,which often exhibit lower disclosure quality and greater information asymmetry.Research suggests that introducing state-owned capital can promote private enterprises'high-quality development.As minority shareholders,state-owned capital provides resource advantages while allowing private sector decision-making to remain intact.State-owned shareholders will also actively perform supervisory and governance responsibilities to protect their interests.However,corporate information disclosure decisions are primarily overseen by the board of directors,and the exact impact of state-owned shareholders'involvement in private enterprise boards has rarely been studied.Whether state-owned shareholders can effectively alleviate information asymmetry through high-level governance is crucial to the effectiveness of reverse mixed-ownership reform in improving the quality of information disclosure in listed companies.According to relevant provisions in the Company Law,state-owned shareholders have the right to board seats proportional to their shareholding.By appointing directors to participate in corporate decision-making and supervising management's actions,state-owned shareholders can mitigate potential misconduct by major shareholders,enhance board efficiency and regulatory compliance,and reduce opportunistic information disclosure by major shareholders and management,thus improving the quality of information disclosure and alleviates information asymmetry.In the financing market,state-owned capital participation and board

关 键 词：国有股东委派董事 信息不对称 民营企业 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]