会计师事务所随机监管与中小股东异议:基于审计师议案的经验证据  

Random Inspection of Audit Firms and Dissent from Minority Shareholders:Evidence from Auditor Proposals

作　　者：陈运森[1] 陆晨 于耀 Chen Yunsen;Lu Chen;Yu Yao(School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081

出　　处：《管理评论》2024年第12期235-248,共14页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72272168);北京社会科学基金青年学术带头人项目(24DTR029)。

摘　　要：推动中小股东积极行权是践行“监管人民性”的重要体现。本文利用手工收集的会计师事务所随机监管和中小股东续聘审计师议案投票数据,探讨证监会对事务所的随机监管能否激发中小股东参与审计师议案的积极性。实证结果表明,会计师事务所随机监管能显著提高被监管客户的中小股东对续聘审计师议案的异议率,尤其在审计师声誉较差、审计质量较低、外部监督薄弱的情境下,激励效应更为显著。机制检验表明,会计师事务所随机监管通过提升市场和中小股东的关注度,以及促进中小股东信息获取来推动其积极表达对审计师议案的异议。进一步分析表明,会计师事务所随机监管增加了被监管客户变更审计师的可能性和中小股东对年报议案的异议率。同时,会计师事务所随机监管兼具事务所分所及行业的溢出效应。本文结论为会计师事务所随机监管如何影响审计师议案的中小股东异议率提供了新的理论视角和实证证据,也为监管部门引导中小股东积极行权提供了启示。Encouraging the active exercise of rights by minority shareholders is a significant part of“people⁃oriented”regulatory ap⁃proach.This paper utilizes manually collected data on the random inspection of audit firms and voting data from minority shareholders on the reappointment of auditors to explore whether the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s random inspection of audit firms can mo⁃tivate minority shareholders to participate in auditor⁃related proposals.Empirical results reveal that random inspection of accounting firms significantly increases the rate of dissent among minority shareholders of regulated audit firm clients towards the reappointment of audi⁃tors,particularly in situations characterized by poor auditor reputation,low audit quality,and weak external supervision.Mechanism tests show that by drawing the attention of both the market and minority shareholders,and keeping minority shareholders in the loop,ran⁃dom inspection of audit firms makes minority shareholders willing to express their dissent from audit proposals.Further analyses indicate that random inspection of audit firms enhances the likelihood of regulated clients changing auditors and the rate of minority shareholders’dissent from annual report proposals.Moreover,it exhibits spillover effects across both audit offices and within the industry.The conclu⁃sions of this paper provide a new theoretical perspective and empirical evidence on how random inspection of audit firms affects minority shareholders’intention to vote against audit proposals,and also offer potential approaches for regulatory authorities to guide minority shareholders towards active participation.

关 键 词：会计师事务所随机监管 股东投票 中小股东异议 证券监管 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]