基于选择模型的供应商在平台独家销售的市场均衡分析  

Market Equilibrium Analysis of Vendor Exclusive Sales on Platforms Based on Choice Model

作　　者：翟胜辉 贺敏轩 ZHAI Shenghui;HE Minxuan(School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing,100190)

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京100190

出　　处：《科技促进发展》2024年第11期886-893,共8页Science & Technology for Development

摘　　要：本研究探讨了由明星供应商、普通供应商、两个平台和消费者组成的市场竞争机制。通过构建四阶段博弈模型,分析了独家销售策略在平台竞争中的均衡结果及其对市场结构的影响。研究发现,无论明星产品是否独家销售,市场均存在唯一的纳什均衡与子博弈完美均衡。在某些条件下,明星供应商会选择在特定平台上独家销售。本研究为消费者、供应商和平台的决策提供了一定的科学支持。This study examined the market competition mechanism consisting of a star supplier,a normal supplier,two platforms,and consumers.By constructing a four-stage game model,this study analyzed the equilibrium outcomes of exclusive sale strategies in platform competition and their impact on market structure.It was found that there was a unique Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium in the market regardless of whether the star product was sold exclusively or not.Under certain conditions,the star supplier may choose to sell exclusively on a specific platform.This study provided scientific support for decision-making by consumers,suppliers,and platforms.

关 键 词：独家销售 选择模型 平台竞争 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]