维特根斯坦论“标准”与他心——从“标准”概念的两种阐释谈起  

On Criteria and Other Minds by Wittgenstein:Starting from Two Interpretations of the Concept of“Criteria”

作　　者：韩国笑 HAN Guoxiao(Collegeof Philosophy,Nankai University,Tianjin 300350,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学哲学院,天津300350

出　　处：《安康学院学报》2025年第1期104-109,116,共7页Journal of Ankang University

摘　　要：“标准”是维特根斯坦后期用以探讨心理学语词用法的重要概念。在传统的认识论解读中,语词用法的“标准”被认为是特定状态的证据,可为断定某人处于某种状态之中提供辩护。在这种证据观念下,“标准”的引入被视为维特根斯坦反驳关于他心的怀疑主义的关键。新兴的语法解读针锋相对地指出,标准概念只有语法含义,没有认识论含义,维特根斯坦对这一概念的使用没有反怀疑主义的意图。这两种解读各有独到之处,但也面临一些困难,通过引入维特根斯坦的确定性思想,夏洛克(Danièle Moyal-Sharrock)为消解这种困难提供了颇具启发性的思路。The concept of a criterion is extremely important in Wittgenstein's later work. He uses it to clarify the grammar of psychological expressions. In the standard epistemological style of interpretation, criteria of psychological expressions are seen as evidence for certain mental states, which can justify a claim to know of another mental state. Because of the notion of criteria evidence, the concept of criteria is considered as a philosophical concept, which leads to a refutation of skepticism about other minds. The emergent grammatical reading has argued that the concept of a criterion makes no epistemic sense but only a grammatical meaning. Wittgenstein's use of this term has no anti-skeptical intention. These two interpretations each have their unique features, but also face some difficulties. By introducing Wittgenstein's idea of certainty, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock offers a quite illuminating approach to dissolving those problems.

关 键 词：维特根斯坦 “标准” 语法 关于他心的怀疑主义 确定性 

分 类 号：B561.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]