“国家队”持股的商誉泡沫治理效应研究——基于我国非金融类上市公司的经验证据  

Research on Governance Effect of Goodwill Bubble of “National Team” Shareholding

作　　者：邓英[1] 佘海英 DENG Ying;SHE Haiying(School of Economics and Management,Changsha University of Technology,Changsha 410114,Hunan)

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙410114

出　　处：《陕西理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第1期20-31,共12页Journal of Shaanxi University of Technology(Social Science)

基　　金：湖南省教育厅科学研究项目(23A0267)。

摘　　要：近年来,随着资本市场中商誉泡沫风险的持续累积,商誉泡沫治理已成为学术界和实务界共同关注的重要话题。为有效解决因溢价并购产生的商誉泡沫问题,选取2015—2022年A股非金融类上市公司为样本,理论分析和实证检验了“国家队”持股的商誉泡沫治理效应及其机制。研究发现,“国家队”持股能够有效治理商誉泡沫,该治理效应可以通过提高公司治理水平,进而治理代理冲突和信息不对称等渠道来实现,且“国家队”持股对商誉泡沫的治理效应在高溢价并购公司和市场化程度高地区更显著。In recent years,with the continuous accumulation of the risk of goodwill bubble in the capital market,the governance of goodwill bubble has become an important topic in academic and practical circles.In order to effectively solve the problem of goodwill bubble caused by Premium M&A,this paper selects 2015-2022 a-share non-financial listed companies as sample,theoretical analysis and empirical test of“National team”ownership of goodwill bubble governance effect and its mechanism.The study found that the“National team”ownership could effectively manage the goodwill bubble,and this governance effect could be achieved by improving the level of corporate governance,and then managing proxy conflicts and Information asymmetry,moreover,the governance effect of“National team”ownership on goodwill bubble is more significant in high premium M&A companies and high marketization region.

关 键 词：“国家队”持股 商誉泡沫 公司治理 代理冲突 信息不对称 并购溢价 

分 类 号：F271.4[经济管理—企业管理]