考虑谎报行为的E-制造/再制造逆向供应链定价决策研究  

Pricing decision in E-manufacturing/remanufacturing reverse supply chain considering consumer′s and recycler′s misreporting

作　　者：宋利 顾巧论[1] SONG Li;GU Qiaolun(School of Economics and Management,Tianjin University of Technology and Education,Tianjin 300222,China)

机构地区：[1]天津职业技术师范大学经济与管理学院,天津300222

出　　处：《天津职业技术师范大学学报》2024年第4期66-71,共6页Journal of Tianjin University of Technology and Education

摘　　要：针对消费者谎报废旧产品质量等级、回收商谎报回收成本信息的情形,研究了由制造/再制造商和回收商所组成的E-制造/再制造逆向供应链定价决策问题。通过数值分析,探讨消费者和回收商谎报程度对供应链成员定价决策以及利润的影响。研究发现:回收商利润随着消费者谎报程度的增加先降低后升高,制造/再制造商利润随着消费者谎报程度的增加先升高后降低,二者利润均随着回收商谎报程度的增加而降低。制造/再制造商可以通过相应的激励措施和惩罚措施来控制回收商和消费者谎报维持在较低程度,从而降低回收成本。To address the problems of consumers misreporting the quality level of waste products and recyclers misreporting the recycling cost information,this paper studies the pricing decision effect of an E-manufacturing/remanufacturing reverse supply chain composed of a recycler and a manufacturer/remanufacturer with a self-built platform.Numerical analysis is employed to assess the impact of the degree of misreporting by consumers and recyclers on the pricing strategies and profits of supply chain members.The study reveals that the recycler′s profit first decreases and then increases with the increase of the consumer′s misreporting degree,whereas the manufacturer/remanufacturer′s profit first increases and then decreases with the increase of the consumer′s misreporting degree,and that both profits decrease with the increase of the recycler′s misreporting degree.The manufacturer/remanufacturer can control the misreporting of recyclers and consumers by appropriate incentive measures and penalties,and reduce the recycling cost.

关 键 词：信息谎报 自建平台 逆向供应链 定价决策 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]