高管薪酬激励、相对绩效评价与商业银行系统性风险  

Executive Compensation Incentives,Relative Performance Evaluation and Commercial Banks'Systemic Risks

作　　者：刘孟飞 蒋维 LIU Meng-fei;JIANG Wei(International Business School,Shaanxi Normal University,Xi'an 710119,China;School of Accounting,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chendu 611130,China)

机构地区：[1]陕西师范大学国际商学院,陕西西安710119 [2]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《数理统计与管理》2025年第1期20-40,共21页Journal of Applied Statistics and Management

基　　金：2020年度国家社科基金后期资助一般(20FJYB052);项目国家社会科学基金一般项目(15BJL024);教育部科技发展中心高校产学研创新基金(2019J01009);西安市社科基金规划项目(19J31)。

摘　　要：本文通过建立基于相对绩效评估的银行高管-股东多阶段博弈模型,对高管薪酬激励与银行系统性风险的关联机制进行理论分析,并采用2005-2019年中国33家上市银行数据,从绝对薪酬与相对薪酬激励强度视角,实证检验高管薪酬激励对银行系统性风险的影响效应,并就银行风险承担在其中的传导作用及高管薪酬激励对不同类型银行的影响异质性进行了探讨。研究发现:(1)高管团队薪酬激励强度的提高,会加剧银行的系统性风险。(2)市场风险在高管薪酬激励与银行系统性风险之间存在显著的中介效应,而银行的个体特质风险不存在中介效应。(3)薪酬激励对我国不同类型商业银行系统性风险的影响效应存在明显差异。相对而言,高管薪酬激励对非系统重要性银行的影响更为显著。本文研究有助于厘清高管薪酬机制的激励效应,可以为党的十九大报告所提出的“深化金融体制改革”和“守住不发生系统性金融风险的底线”提供理论与经验证据支撑。Based on the relative performance evaluation,this paper establishes a bank executiveshareholder two-stage game model,and conducts theoretical analysis of the relationship between executive compensation incentives and bank systemic risks.Using the data of 33 listed banks in China from 2005 to 2019,we empirically test the effect of executive compensation incentives on banks'systemic risks,and discusses the transmission effect of bank's risk-taking and the heterogeneity effect of executive compensation incentives on diferent types of banks'systemic risk.The results show that:(1)The increase of executive team compensation incentive intensity will aggravate banks'systemic risk of.(2)Market risk has a significant mediating effect between executive compensation incentives and bank's systemic risk,while individual idiosyncratic risk does not.(3)There are significant differences in the impact of executive compensation incentives on different types of commercial banks.In contrast,executive compensation incentives have a more significant impact on non-systemically important banks.This study is helpful to clarify the incentive effect of executive compensation mechanism,and can provide theoretical and empirical evidence support for"deepening the reform of the financial system"and"guarding the bottom line of avoiding systemic financial risks"proposed in the report of the 19th CPC National Congress.

关 键 词：商业银行 高管薪酬 相对绩效评估 系统性风险 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学] O212[理学—概率论与数理统计]