考虑外部不确定性的供应商产品质量激励契约设计  

Incentive contract design of suppliers′product qualityconsidering external uncertainty

作　　者：王建 张展博 WANG Jian;ZHANG Zhanbo(School of Economics and Management,Jiangsu University of Science and Technology,Zhenjiang 212100,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏科技大学经济管理学院,镇江212100

出　　处：《江苏科技大学学报(自然科学版)》2025年第1期92-98,共7页Journal of Jiangsu University of Science and Technology:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71802100);科技部高端外国专家引进计划(G2023014062);江苏省社科基金项目(23GLB001)。

摘　　要：面对外部市场环境复杂与不确定性的不断加剧,供应商产品质量的激励契约设计可能出现效率缺失难题,考虑从管理产品质量的货币和关系激励的双层视角出发,构建单次和无限重复博弈模型,求解外部不确定性环境影响下的最优激励契约,并深入分析两种激励机制的适用和转换条件.进一步考虑供应商的公平关切对激励契约影响,构建公平关切博弈模型.结果表明:外部不确定性的提升会侵蚀货币激励的效率,从而扩大关系激励的使用范围;中小供应商劣势公平关切的增加,会提升货币激励成本.In the face of the increasing complexity and uncertainty of the external market environment,the incentive contract design of supplier product quality may have the problem of lack of efficiency.Considering from the dual-layer perspective of monetary and relational incentives for managing product quality,we construct single and infinite repetition game models to solve the optimal incentive contract under the influence of the external uncertainty environment and analyse in depth the conditions for the applicability and conversion of the two kinds of incentive mechanisms.We further consider the impact of suppliers′fairness concerns on the incentive contract and construct a fairness concern game model.The results show that:elevated external uncertainty erodes the efficiency of monetary incentives,thus expanding the use of relational incentives;and the increase in disadvantageous fairness concerns of small and medium-sized suppliers raises the cost of monetary incentives.

关 键 词：外部不确定性 货币激励 关系激励 公平关切 最优契约 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]