药品企业反向支付协议的福利效应与竞争政策创新  

The Welfare Effects of Drug Firms’Reverse Payment Agreements and the Innovation of Competition Policy

作　　者：于左[1,2] 杨成林 YU Zuo;YANG Cheng-lin(Center for Industrial and Business Organization,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics;Institute of Digital Economy,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心 [2]东北财经大学数字经济研究院

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2025年第1期118-136,共19页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：“兴辽英才计划”文化名家暨“四个一批”领军人才项目“以竞争政策加快全国统一大市场建设和促进辽宁全面振兴取得新突破”(批准号XLYC2210001)。

摘　　要：中国专利链接制度的落实将在制度层面催生更多反向支付协议案件,对反向支付协议可能产生的竞争损害,监管部门需要尽早关注并采取有效措施予以防止。本文通过构建关于反向支付协议的博弈模型,研究达成反向支付协议中和解金额的选择及对消费者福利的影响,并探讨通过建立反向支付协议申报与反垄断审查制度以防止损害消费者福利的必要性与可行性。研究发现,在对称信息条件下,达成反向支付协议的和解金额等于禁止反向支付协议时仿制药企业的利润,达成协议双方的利润均不小于禁止协议时的利润。在不对称信息条件下达成反向支付协议,一定会有一方的利润水平低于禁止反向支付协议时的利润水平。两种条件都会最大化延迟进入市场时间,损害消费者福利。本文研究证明,存在既不损害消费者福利又不使协议各方利润减少的条件,即达成反向支付协议的各方对专利强度拥有共同判断,使仿制药企业拥有更强的讨价还价能力,并限制达成反向支付协议的和解金额。鉴于此,本文提出可以通过竞争政策创新,即建立反向支付协议申报和反垄断审查制度,有效解决防止药品企业通过反向支付协议损害消费者福利这一难题。This paper develops a game model to analyze the welfare implications of reverse payment agreements,examining the selection of settlement amounts and their impact on consumer welfare.Additionally,it discusses the necessity and feasibility of establishing a notification and antitrust scrutiny institution for reverse payment agreements to protect consumer welfare.This paper finds that under scrutiny after an agreement is reached,reverse payment agreements between firms will not satisfy the proportionality principle.With symmetric information,when the original firm has sufficient bargaining power and reverse payments are permitted,the original firm maximizes its profit while the generic drug firm’s profit equals what it would be if reverse payments were prohibited.With asymmetric information,the original firm anticipates two possible profit scenarios based on expected litigation costs.Maximizing expected profits leads to two settlement amount options:higher expected litigation costs result in higher settlement amounts,and vice versa.With asymmetric information,the actual patent strength becomes irrelevant to the profits obtained from reaching an agreement.Consequently,one party’s expected profit will always be lower than that without reverse payment agreements.The stronger the patent strength,the more unfavorable the reverse payment agreement is to the original firm,and the more favorable it is to the generic drug firm.As bargaining power shifts from the original firm to the generic drug firm,settlement amounts tend to increase.Regarding consumer welfare,whether symmetric or asymmetric information,delayed market entry due to reverse payment agreements enhances consumer welfare only if it is less than the patent strength;otherwise,it harms consumer welfare.This paper further explores the feasibility of establishing notification and antitrust scrutiny institutions for reverse payment agreements.It demonstrates that under settlement conditions,an incentive-compatible outcome can be achieved.By implementing notificat

关 键 词：反向支付协议 专利强度 消费者福利 竞争政策创新 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]