不完全信息下高铁晚点与乘客选择行为博弈模型  

Game model of high⁃speed railway delay and passenger choice behavior under incomplete information

作　　者：雷爱国 胡启洲[1] 吴啸宇 曲思源[2] LEI Ai-guo;HU Qi-zhou;WU Xiao-yu;QU Si-yuan(Nanjing University of Science and Technology,School of Automation,Nanjing 210094,China;China Railway Shanghai Group Co.,Ltd.,Shanghai 200040,China)

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学自动化学院,南京210094 [2]中国铁路上海铁路局集团有限公司,上海200040

出　　处：《吉林大学学报(工学版)》2024年第12期3496-3504,共9页Journal of Jilin University:Engineering and Technology Edition

基　　金：河南省重点科技攻关项目(182102310004);中国铁路上海局集团有限公司科研项目(2022001)。

摘　　要：研究了高速铁路列车的到达状态对铁路乘客选择行为的具体影响因素。首先,构建高速列车到达状态与铁路乘客选择行为演化博弈模型。其次,分析博弈双方的演化行为,获得复制动态系统的演化均衡策略。最后,进行仿真验证,结果表明:演化博弈行为最终有两个演化稳定状态,当高速列车晚点时间在30 min以内,高速列车趋于准时到达策略,乘客趋于选择乘车策略;当晚点时间大于30 min,列车趋于准时到达策略,乘客趋于选择退票策略。改变博弈参数的值可以定向调整博弈双方的演化方向,能有效提高高速列车晚点时的铁路乘客乘车比例。The specific influencing factors of the arrival status of high-speed trains on railway passengers'choice behavior were studied.First,an evolutionary game model of the arrival status of high-speed trains and railway passengers'choice behavior was constructed.Then,the evolutionary behaviors of both players in the game were analyzed,and the evolutionary equilibrium strategies of the replicator dynamic system were obtained.Finally,simulation verification was carried out,and the results indicated that there are two evolutionary stable states.When the delay time of the high-speed train is within 30 minutes,the train tends to adopt a punctual arrival strategy,and passengers tend to choose to travel.When the delay time exceeds 30 minutes,the train tends to adopt a punctual arrival strategy,while passengers tend to choose to refund their tickets.The game parameters can be adjusted to direct the evolutionary direction of both players,which can effectively improve the proportion of railway passengers choosing to travel when the high-speed train is delayed.

关 键 词：交通运输 高铁晚点 不完全信息 演化博弈 

分 类 号：U293[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]