碳交易机制下低碳减排的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low-carbon Emission Reduction Under Carbon Trading Mechanism

作　　者：郭小莉 关海玲[2] GUO Xiaoli;GUAN Hailing(School of Economics and Management,Shanxi University,Taiyuan,Shanxi 030006;School of Economics and Manaqement,Taiyuan University of Science and Technology,Taiyuan,Shanxi 030024,China)

机构地区：[1]山西大学经济与管理学院,山西太原030006 [2]太原科技大学经济与管理学院,山西太原030024

出　　处：《江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2024年第6期95-106,共12页Journal of Jiangxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：山西省哲学社会科学规划课题“山西省行业碳排放权分配及其减排成本最小化方案研究”(编号:2023YJ090);山西省科技战略研究专项“山西省创新生态建设评估研究”(编号:202204031401025)。

摘　　要：为探寻碳交易机制下低碳决策的博弈互动机理和影响因素,本文将消费者纳入政企演化博弈模型中,对三者进行演化博弈分析并使用数值仿真进行验证。研究显示:(1)通过碳交易和碳积分补贴手段组合使用能够实现积极监管、积极转型、购买低碳产品这一理想情景。(2)演化博弈系统受政策收益、碳交易成本和收益、碳积分补贴等多种因素影响。(3)将碳交易机制纳入博弈系统可以提升企业和消费者低碳减排的积极性,尤以碳交易为主、政策监管为辅的政策合力机制激励效果最为理想。In order to explore the game interaction mechanism and influencing factors of low-carbon decision-making under the carbon trading mechanism,this paper included consumers in the government and enterprise evolutionary game model,conducted evolutionary game analysis of the three and verified them by numerical simulation.The research shows that:(1)The“ideal scenario”(active regulation,active transformation and purchase of low-carbon products)can be achieved through the combination of carbon trading and carbon credits subsidies.(2)The evolutionary game system is affected by common factors such as policy benefits,carbon trading costs and benefits,carbon credits subsidies,etc.(3)Incorporating the carbon trading mechanism into the game system can enhance the enthusiasm of enterprises and consumers for low-carbon emission reduction,and the policy synergy mechanism with carbon trading as the main and policy supervision as the auxiliary has a more ideal incentive effect.

关 键 词：碳交易 低碳减排 政府监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]