国际组织应对主导国施压的行为逻辑:适应、重塑还是抵制?  

The Logic of International Organizations’Responses to the Pressure from Dominant States:Adapt,Reshape or Resist?

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作  者:周逸江 Zhou Yijiang

机构地区:[1]同济大学政治与国际关系学院,上海200092

出  处:《国际论坛》2025年第1期76-95,158,159,共22页International Forum

摘  要:国际组织与其主导国的互动是国际关系研究的重要议题。主导国往往试图将国际组织作为推进其政策议程的工具,而国际组织则需要在维护自身利益与维系主导国信任之间谋求平衡。尽管与主导国的特殊关系使特定国际组织对主导国具有更高的依赖度,但也可能为其应对主导国政策压力提供更多灵活性。那么,面对主导国的政策压力,国际组织何时能够成功抵制,何时又会做出妥协和让步?为此,本文聚焦主导国国内政治和国际组织主要成员的立场分布情况,指出国际组织应对主导国施压的策略选择受到这两个变量的影响,进而导致了“适应”“重塑”或“抵制”三种不同的应对结果。通过对里根政府要求世界银行扩大政策性贷款、小布什政府推动世行的债务减免,以及特朗普政府施压世行终止对华贷款三个案例的分析,本文发现上述理论框架能够较好地解释国际组织在不同情境下应对美国施压时的行为差异。本研究有助于深化对国际组织自主性的理解,对把握国际组织在应对大国政治中的角色定位和战略抉择具有重要意义。The interaction between international organizations(IOs)and their dominant states is an important issue in the study of international relations.Dominant states often attempt to use IOs as a tool to advance their policy agendas,while IOs need to strike a balance between preserving their own interests and maintaining the trust of dominant states.Although the special relationship with dominant states may lead specific IOs to have a higher degree of dependence on them,it can also provide these IOs with more flexibility in response to the pressure from dominant states regarding their policies.This raises the question:Under what circumstances can IOs successfully resist policy pressure from dominant states,and when will they make compromises and concessions?To address this question,this article focuses on the distribution of domestic political conditions in the dominant state and the positions of major members within the IO,proposing a theoretical framework to explain the behavioral logic of IOs.The framework indicates that the choice of strategies by IOs in response to the pressure from dominant states is influenced by these two variables,leading to three different outcomes:“adaptation,”“reshaping,”and“resistance”.Through an analysis of three cases–the Reagan administration’s demand for the World Bank to expand policy-based lending,the Bush administration’s push for debt relief at the World Bank,and the Trump administration’s pressure on the World Bank to terminate lending to China–this paper finds that the aforementioned theoretical framework can effectively explain the behavioral differences of IOs when responding to U.S.pressure under various circumstances.The research contributes to a deeper understanding of the autonomy of IOs and holds significant importance for grasping their role positioning and strategic choices in the context of great power politics.

关 键 词:国际组织 主导国立场 自主性 美国对外政策 世界银行 国际开发协会 

分 类 号:D51[政治法律—政治学]

 

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