基于复杂网络演化博弈的创业团队资源共享行为扩散研究  

Diffusion of Entrepreneurial Team Resource Sharing Behavior Based on Complex Network Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：刘方南 胡海青[1] 秦欣悦 LIU Fang-nan;HU Hai-qing;QIN Xin-yue(School of Economics and Management,Xi'an University of Technology,Xi'an 710054)

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710054

出　　处：《软科学》2025年第1期54-60,84,共8页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72072144、71672144、71372173、70972053);陕西省创新能力支撑计划软科学研究项目(2024ZC-YBXM-031、2021KRM183、2019KRZ007、2022KRM129、2022KRM097);西安市科技局软科学研究重点项目(23RKYJ0001、21RKYJ0009);陕西省哲学社会科学研究项目(2023HZ1036、2022HZ1824、2022HZ1581);三秦英才特殊支持计划哲学社会科学和文化艺术领域领军人才项目。

摘　　要：基于复杂网络演化博弈模型,通过仿真分析了创业苗圃的奖惩机制及参与资源共享的成本与协同收益对资源共享行为扩散的影响。结果表明:创业苗圃的奖惩机制能够有效促进创业团队资源共享行为扩散,其中,创业团队资源共享行为扩散随奖励力度的增加而提高,随着惩罚力度的增加先提高后下降;创业团队资源共享行为扩散随着协同收益的增加先提高后趋于稳定,存在边际效益先增加后减少的现象,且成本增加会抑制创业团队参与资源共享;参与资源共享的创业团队的初始比例会对资源共享行为扩散产生正向影响。Based on a complex network evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the reward and punishment mechanisms of entrepreneurial nurseries, as well as the impact of costs and collaborative benefits on resource-sharing behavior diffusion when participating in resource-sharing. The results show that the reward and punishment mechanisms of entrepreneurial nurseries can effectively promote the diffusion of resource-sharing behavior among entrepreneurial teams. Specifically, the diffusion of resource-sharing behavior increases with the intensity of rewards and initially increases but then decreases with the intensity of punishments. The diffusion of resource-sharing behavior also increases with the growth of collaborative benefits but eventually stabilizes, exhibiting a phenomenon where marginal benefits first increase and then decrease, while higher costs inhibit entrepreneurial teams from participating in resource-sharing. Additionally, the initial proportion of entrepreneurial teams participating in resource-sharing positively impacts the diffusion of resource-sharing behavior.

关 键 词：资源共享行为 复杂网络演化博弈 创业团队 创业苗圃 

分 类 号：F279.2[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]