基金管理费激励对投资者申赎行为的影响研究  

A Study on the Impact of Fund Management Fee Incentives on Investor Subscription and Redemption Behavior

作　　者：钟小凯 张澍原 薛庆[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学(北京)经济管理学院,北京102249

出　　处：《上海金融》2024年第11期44-56,共13页Shanghai Finance

摘　　要：我国金融市场普遍存在“强代理人-弱委托人”的委托代理问题,怎样设计出合理的管理费激励制度,打破“基金赚钱,基民不赚钱”的利益冲突困境,成为亟须解决的问题。本文选择2013-2023年间的151只浮动费率基金以及匹配筛选出的331只固定费率基金作为研究对象,发现基金管理费激励效率和投资者净申购率呈倒“U”型关系。同时相比固定费率基金,净申购率对浮动费率基金的激励效率变动更加敏感,投资者更加偏好较低激励效率的浮动费率基金;在小规模或高风险调整收益的浮动费率基金中,管理费激励效率对净申购的影响关系不显著。本研究有助于完善现有的基金管理费用激励制度,在实现对基金管理者有效激励的同时,吸引更多投资者。In China’s financial market,the principal-agent problem commonly manifests as“strong agents,weak principals”.The critical issue is how to design a reasonable management fee incentive system to break the dilemma of“fund managers profiting while fund investors do not”.The article selects 151 floating rate funds and 331 fixed rate funds from 2013 to 2023 as research subjects.It finds that the relationship between the efficiency of fund management fee incentives and the net subscription rate of investors is follows an inverted U-shape.The study also reveals that,compared to fixed rate funds,the net subscription rate is more sensitive to changes in incentive efficiency of floating rate funds,and investors prefer floating rate funds with lower incentive efficiency.In small-scale or high risk-adjusted return floating rate funds,the impact of management fee incentive efficiency on net subscriptions is not significant.This research contributes to improving the current fund management fee incentive systems,effectively motivating fund managers and attracting more investors.

关 键 词：管理费激励 基金申购赎回 投资者行为 投资组合风险 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F830.9F224