连锁股东与企业避税  

Cross-Ownership Shareholders and Corporate Tax Avoidance

作　　者：李世刚 曾畅 黄一松[1] 章卫东[1] LI Shigang;ZENG Chang;HUANG Yisong;ZHANG Weidong(School of Accounting,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,南昌330013

出　　处：《管理科学》2024年第4期126-146,共21页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72462021,71962012);江西省教育科学规划项目(22YB051);江西省高校人文社会科学研究项目(JJ23224)。

摘　　要：随着上市公司连锁股东持股比例的提高,连锁股东的治理效果成为当下学术界研究的热点话题。连锁股东不仅具有丰富的信息和资源优势,能够发挥治理协同效应,还能按照投资组合价值最大化的目标干预产品市场定价,产生合谋效应。上述两种截然不同的治理效应是否会对企业避税行为产生影响则是需要研究的问题。以连锁股东的治理协同理论和合谋理论为基础,结合企业避税的传统理论和代理理论,通过收集2004年至2020年沪深A股上市公司数据,采用实际税率、名义税率与实际税率的差额测量企业避税,并按5%和10%的连锁标准测量连锁股东,采用最小二乘回归方法,探讨连锁股东与企业避税的关系,并分别检验控股型连锁股东、机构投资型连锁股东和最终控制人投资组合型连锁股东对企业避税的不同影响。研究结果表明,总体而言,连锁股东对企业避税发挥了合谋效应,通过提高避税的风险承担水平、关联交易比例和提升产品市场集中度等方式促进企业避税程度的提高。通过Heckman两阶段、倾向得分法+双重差分法、2008年实施的《中华人民共和国企业所得税法》外生政策冲击等内生性控制检验和按照10%持股标准计算的连锁股东、名义税率与实际税率的差额测量企业避税等稳健性检验后,结论仍然保持不变。异质性分析结果表明,控股型连锁股东能够显著提高企业避税水平,存在最终控制人投资组合的连锁股东更能显著增加企业避税程度,机构投资型连锁股东则发挥了治理协同效应,降低了企业避税水平。研究发现对于进一步全面认识连锁股东及不同类型的连锁股东对企业避税行为的影响具有重要的启示,为监管机构进一步规范连锁股东在中国资本市场的作用提供了经验证据的支持和决策参考依据。With the increase of cross-ownership shareholders of listed companies,the governance effect of cross-ownership shareholders has become a hot topic of academic research nowadays.Cross-ownership shareholders not only have rich information and resource advantages,and can play the governance synergy effect,but also can intervene in the product market pricing according to the goal of maximizing the value of the investment portfolio,and arise the collusion effect.Whether these two distinct governance effects have an impact on corporate tax avoidance is a question that needs to be studied.Based on the governance synergy theory and collusion theory of cross-ownership shareholders,combined with the traditional theory of corporate tax avoidance and agency theory,this study collects the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2004 to 2020,measures corporate tax avoidance by using the effective tax rate,and the difference between the nominal tax rate and the actual tax rate.Meanwhile the paper measures cross-ownership shareholders according to the chain standard of 5%and 10%,and adopts the least-squares regression method to explore the relationship between crossownership shareholders and corporate tax avoidance,as well as to test the different impacts of controlling cross-ownership shareholders,institutional investment cross-ownership shareholders and ultimate controller portfolio cross-ownership shareholders on corporate tax avoidance respectively.The results of the study show that,in general,cross-ownership shareholders exert a collusive effect on corporate tax avoidance,promoting the degree of corporate tax avoidance by increasing the level of risk-taking for tax avoidance,the proportion of connected transactions and product market concentration.The conclusions remain unchanged after endogeneity control tests such as Heckman′s two-stage approach,PSM+DID method,exogenous policy shocks of the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People′s Republic of China implemented in 2008,and robustness tests such

关 键 词：连锁股东 企业避税 风险承担 关联交易 产品市场集中度 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]