信息不对称、碳数据质量与碳减排政策选择——兼论中国碳市场的高质量发展  

Asymmetric Information,Carbon Data Manipulation,and Policy Choices for Carbon Reduction:Insights into the High-Quality Development of China's Carbon Market

作　　者：张一林 蔡桢 郁芸君 ZHANG Yilin;CAI Zhen;YU Yunjun(Lingnan College,Advanced Institute of Finance,Sun Yat-Sen University;Business School,Sun Yat-Sen University;Wenlan School of Business,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law)

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院/高级金融研究院,广东广州510275 [2]中山大学商学院,广东深圳518107 [3]中南财经政法大学文澜学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《金融研究》2024年第9期114-133,共20页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金杰出青年项目(2023B1515020068);国家自然科学基金重点项目(72132010)的资助。

摘　　要：随着“双碳”战略不断推进,一些控排企业可能捏造碳排放数据以节约减排成本。如何构建既能防范碳数据失真风险、又能有效激励企业减排的政策体系,是学术界和实务界亟待解决的新问题。本文基于一个包含政府和异质性企业的委托代理模型,将企业碳数据造假决策内生化,研究当政府观察不到企业的减排成本、也难以确定企业碳排放数据的真实性时,命令型政策和市场型政策的减排效果、最优政策优化与政策选择。研究发现,市场型政策在碳数据容错性、减少碳排放造假量、控制社会碳排放总量和提升社会总福利方面均优于命令型政策,政府应坚定不移地持续推动命令型政策向市场型政策转型。但在政策转型过程中,仍不能忽视碳数据失真风险:一方面,碳数据造假会扭曲碳市场定价,并降低碳市场的活跃程度;另一方面,在政策转型的过程中,减排主力企业的碳数据造假动机可能较转型前增加。本文研究对于前瞻性地防范碳数据失真风险以及推动碳市场高质量发展具有启示意义。At the 75th United Nations General Assembly,China solemnly committed to the international community to achieve carbon peaking by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060.Under this“dual carbon”target,a major challenge facing China is promoting a comprehensive green and low-carbon transition among enterprises and continuously advancing carbon emission control and reduction.The government typically adopts environmental regulatory policies to manage corporate carbon emissions,primarily employing two types of policy tools:The first is command-and-control policies,represented by the“dual control of energy consumption,”in which administrative authorities enforce emissions reduction based on laws,regulations,and standards.The second type is market-based policies centered on carbon emissions trading.In practice,due to difficulties in accurately obtaining each firm's carbon emissions and abatement costs,as well as deficiencies in the Monitoring,Reporting,and Verification(MRV)system,regulated firms may manipulate carbon emission data to conceal their actual emissions—referred to here as“carbon emission fraud”—resulting in a discrepancy between the observed emissions data and the actual emissions.Faced with the potential risks of carbon emission manipulation,how should the government set the policy parameters for command-and-control and market-based policies,including emissions caps and penalties for excess emissions?Which policy tool is more effective in curbing firms'incentives for carbon data manipulation and achieving better emission reduction outcomes?To address these questions,this paper constructs a principal-agent model involving the government and heterogeneous firms,under conditions of asymmetric information where the government cannot observe firms'low-carbon transition costs or actual emissions.The model endogenizes firms'decision-making on carbon emission fraud to facilitate the subsequent analysis.The study finds that market-based policies achieve greater resilience to carbon data distortion and high

关 键 词：碳数据失真 碳交易 碳定价 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]