管理层有限视野与企业ESG表现  

Managerial Myopia and Corporate ESG Performance

作　　者：姜富伟 张芷宁 丁慧 JIANG Fuwei;ZHANG Zhining;DING Hui(School of Economics,Xiamen University;The Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics,Xiamen University School of Finance;Central University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院/王亚南经济研究院,福建厦门361005 [2]中央财经大学金融学院,北京100081

出　　处：《金融研究》2024年第9期134-152,共19页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(22&ZD063)的资助。

摘　　要：在高质量发展背景下,企业环境、社会和公司治理(ESG)表现不仅受到投资者的广泛关注,更是影响企业长期经营的重要因素。探究我国企业ESG投入不足的内在动因并设计有效的激励方案,对于提升企业ESG表现具有重要意义。本文探究了企业管理层有限视野对ESG的影响,构建了包含ESG项目的动态契约理论模型,并以2010—2022年A股上市公司为样本进行实证检验。结果显示:管理层有限视野显著制约了企业ESG表现提升,原因是有限视野的管理层降低了公司信息披露质量、削弱了企业对于长期资金的吸引力。与短期业绩挂钩的短期激励会加剧ESG投入不足,与股权挂钩的长期激励则有助于缓解这一问题。此外,来自微观、中观和宏观的经营压力均会加剧管理层有限视野对企业ESG表现的负面影响。本研究为提升企业ESG表现提供了新的理论基础和经验证据。The concept of Environmental,Social,and Governance(ESG)was formally introduced by the United Nations Global Compact in 2004,reflecting a company's comprehensive performance across these three dimensions.ESG has become a critical criterion for investors to assess and evaluate a firm's capacity for sustainable development.Against the backdrop of high-quality development,ESG performance has not only garnered significant attention from investors but has also emerged as a key determinant of a company's long-term operational success.However,ESG practices in China have shown slow improvement,with companies often prioritizing compliance with disclosure requirements rather than proactively enhancing their ESG performance.Therefore,investigating the underlying factors behind the insufficient ESG investment of Chinese firms and designing effective incentive mechanisms to improve their ESG performance is of significant importance.This study focuses on the issue that corporate management may lack a broad perspective when investing in ESG projects,making it difficult to achieve optimal investment decisions.Drawing on agency theory and behavioral economics,this paper develops a dynamic contract model incorporating ESG projects and conducts an empirical analysis using a sample of A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2022.First,the dynamic contract model reveals how managerial myopia negatively impacts a firm's ESG performance.Second,an indicator for managerial myopia is constructed based on the analysis of corporate annual reports,with the effects of linguistic sentiment accounted for using a Chinese financial sentiment dictionary and the BERT model.The results confirm the significant negative impact of managerial myopia on corporate ESG performance.Furthermore,the study examines how short-term and long-term incentives affect this negative impact and explores two specific economic mechanisms:information disclosure quality and the ability to attract long-term capital.Additionally,heterogeneity analysis is conducted to examine how fi

关 键 词：管理层有限视野 ESG表现 动态契约模型 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]