独立董事参加股东大会具有治理效果吗——来自风险承担的证据  

Does the Attendance of Independent Directors at Shareholder Meetings Matter——The Case of Risk Taking

作　　者：秦帅 谭劲松[2] 孔祥婷[2] Qin Shuai

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,510520 [2]中山大学管理学院/现代会计与财务研究中心,510275

出　　处：《会计研究》2024年第10期69-81,共13页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学(71902201);广东省哲学社会科学规划重大项目(GD23SJZ01);广州市基础与应用基础研究专题项目(SL2024A04J01706)的资助。

摘　　要：信息是独立董事正确决策的基础。本文发现独立董事参加股东大会有助于其获取更多真实信息,抑制因代理问题而导致的企业过度风险承担。机制在于独立董事获得更多真实信息后降低了董事会的风险容忍度,且发表异议意见的概率和频率更高。独立董事积极参加股东大会的勤勉行为得到了劳动力市场的奖励,未来会获得更多津贴和董事席位。本文的研究对监管层扩大独立董事的信息获取途径,提高独立董事的履职效果具有参考意义。Information is the basis for independent directors to make correct decisions.This paper finds that the participation of independent directors in shareholders'meetings can help them obtain more real information and restrain excessive risk taking caused by agency problems.The mechanism lies in the fact that after independent directors obtain more real information,the risk tolerance of the board is reduced,and the probability and frequency of dissenting opinions are higher.Independent directors have been rewarded by the labor market for their diligent participation in shareholder meetings and will receive more allowances and directorships in the future.The research of this paper is of reference significance for the supervisory layer to expand the access to information of independent directors and improve the performance effect of independent directors.

关 键 词：独立董事 股东大会 信息获取 风险承担 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]