薪酬管制政策能否抑制国有企业违规?  

Can Compensation Regulation Policy Curb State-owned Enterprises Fraud?

作　　者：乔菲 陈艳利 信志鹏 Qiao Fei

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,116025

出　　处：《会计研究》2024年第10期95-109,共15页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72073019);辽宁省教育厅项目(JYTMS20230636、JYTMS20230656)的资助。

摘　　要：如何建立健全有效的激励约束机制是完善中国特色现代企业制度的关键环节。本文聚焦于2015年实施的国有企业高管薪酬管制政策,探究其对公司违规行为的影响。研究发现:薪酬管制政策实施后,政策前高管薪酬较高的国有企业的违规倾向和违规次数显著降低。机制检验显示,盈余操纵的减少和晋升激励的加强是薪酬管制政策抑制国有企业违规的重要路径。进一步分析表明,薪酬管制政策的违规抑制作用在高管持股比例较高、内外部监督环境较差的国有企业中更为显著。本文为系统评价和审视薪酬管制政策的经济后果提供了更为全面的经验证据,为提高上市公司质量、提升国有企业治理能力、完善中国特色现代企业制度提供政策启示。How to establish and improve an effective incentive and restraint mechanism is the key to complete the modern corporate system with Chinese characteristics.Focusing on the Compensation Regulation Policy of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)implemented in 2015,this paper explores its impact on corporate fraud.The study finds that,after the implementation of Compensation Regulation Policy,SOEs with higher pre-reform executive compensation have significantly lower the tendency and frequency of corporate fraud.The mechanism tests show that the reduction of earnings manipulation and the enhancement of promotion incentives are the important channels through which Compensation Regulation Policy restrains corporate fraud.Further analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of Compensation Regulation Policy on corporate fraud is more significant in SOEs with higher shareholding ratio of executives and weaker internal and external supervisory environment.This study provides comprehensive empirical evidence for systematically evaluating and examining the economic consequences of Compensation Regulation Policy,and offers policy implications for promoting the quality of listed firms,enhancing the governance capacity of SOEs and improving the modern corporate system with Chinese characteristics.

关 键 词：薪酬管制政策 国有企业 公司违规 盈余操纵 晋升激励 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]