基于累计前景理论的右转机动车和行人博弈行为决策  

Game Behavior Decision of Right Turn Vehicle and Pedestrian Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory

作　　者：杨昭 夏晓梅[1] YANG Zhao;XIA Xiaomei(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《物流科技》2025年第5期80-85,共6页Logistics Sci Tech

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(22YJAZH131)。

摘　　要：礼让行人作为城市交通的新风尚,体现了以人为本的交通理念,但一刀切的礼让,对于机动车特别是右转车辆的通行效率造成了较大的影响。以信号交叉口右转机动车及行人为研究对象,运用统计学和博弈论的相关理论知识,对右转机动车让行行人的行为,以及行人穿越行为进行了博弈建模与分析,进一步结合Logistic回归模型计算出右转机动车通过和让行的概率以及行人穿越和等待的概率,并应用累计前景理论,将其转化成价值函数和概率权重函数,得到行人和驾驶员各种策略选择的累积前景值。相关的案例分析表明,与经典的期望效用理论相比,基于累计前景理论建立出的博弈模型,预测准确率可以提高29.4%,能够有效预测行人和机动车互相穿越的决策过程。As a new trend of urban traffic,comity to pedestrians embodies the people-oriented traffic concept,but the one size fits all comity has a great impact on the traffic efficiency of motor vehicles,especially right turning vehicles.Taking right turning vehicles and pedestrians at signalized intersections as the research object,this paper uses the relevant theoretical knowledge of statistics and game theory to model and analyze the behavior of right turning vehicles giving way to pedestrians and pedestrian crossing behavior,and further calculates the probability of right turning vehicles passing and giving way and the probability of pedestrians crossing and waiting by combining with Logistic regression model,and applies it to the cumulative prospect theory.It is transformed into a value function and a probability weight function to obtain the cumulative foreground value of pedestrian and driver strategy choices.The relevant case analysis shows that,compared with the classical expected utility theory,the game model based on the cumulative prospect theory can improve the prediction accuracy by 29.4%,and can effectively predict the decision-making process of pedestrians and motor vehicles crossing each other.

关 键 词：交通工程 信号交叉口 行人过街 人车博弈 累计前景理论 

分 类 号：U491.14[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]