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作 者:于迪 YU Di(College of Economics,Bohai University,Jinzhou 121013,China)
出 处:《物流科技》2025年第5期134-137,共4页Logistics Sci Tech
基 金:辽宁省社科联2024年度辽宁省经济社会发展研究课题项目“低碳供应链动态策略及协调机制研究”(2024lslqnrckt-001);辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目“参考碳排放效应下双渠道供应链最优策略及协调机制微分博弈研究”(L22BGL005)。
摘 要:随着零售商竞争程度加剧和消费者低碳意识提升,且制造商和竞争性零售商均具失望规避特征,在集中和分散决策下构建微分博弈模型,计算得到成员低碳策略、减排量和商誉最优轨迹、各自利润以及系统总利润等,并且进一步设计成本分担契约,实现帕累托改进。研究表明:(1)成本分担机制在满足阈值情况下,才会发生;该成本分担机制能消除分散式决策带来的“双重边际效应”,提升成员利润,实现供应链协调。集中式决策虽是最优决策模式,但其成功实现,还需进一步满足约束条件。(2)成本分担机制下,制造商边际利润和零售商竞争程度越高,分担比例越大;零售商边际利润越高,分担比例越小。(3)制造商减排努力受失望规避程度的抑制,零售商低碳宣传努力不受失望规避程度影响;减排量、商誉以及利润都与失望规避程度负相关。With the intensification of retailers'competition and consumers'awareness of low carbon,and both manufacturers and competitive retailers have the characteristics of disappointment aversion,a differential game model is constructed under centralized and decentralized decision-making to calculate members'low-carbon strategies,the optimal trajectory of emission reductions and goodwill,individual profits and total system profits.The research shows that:First,the cost sharing mechanism will only occur when the threshold is met.The cost sharing mechanism can eliminate the double marginal effect brought about by decentralized decision-making,and achieve coordination.Second,under the cost sharing mechanism,the higher the degree of competition between retailer's and manufacturer's profit margin,the greater the sharing ratio.The higher the retailer's profit margin,the smaller the sharing ratio.Third,manufacturers'emission reduction efforts are inhibited by the degree of disappointment avoidance.And retailers'low-carbon promotion efforts are not affected by the degree of disappointment aversion.Emission reductions,goodwill and profits are all negatively correlated with the degree of disappointment aversion.
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