国企高管薪酬职务倒挂影响企业创新吗  

Can Pay-Position Upside down of SOEs Affect Corporate Innovation

作　　者：毛新述[1] 从阓匀 张晨宇 岳新瑜 Mao Xinshu;Cong Huiyun;Zhang Chenyu;Yue Xinyu(Business School,Beijing Technology and Business University;School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics;Accounting School,Capital University of Economics and Business;Zhengzhou Zhongyuan Sub-branch,Agricultural Bank of China)

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学商学院 [2]中央财经大学会计学院 [3]首都经济贸易大学会计学院 [4]中国农业银行股份有限公司郑州中原支行

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2025年第2期104-115,共12页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72102030、71902006);国家社会科学基金重大项目(22ZDA044)资助。

摘　　要：创新是新发展阶段国资国企高质量发展的重要驱动力,作为驱动企业创新发展的关键,如何建立人才激励机制激发创新活力事关国资国企改革成效。本文基于2007~2020年国有上市公司,从企业创新活动视角考察国企高管“另类”薪酬契约设计(薪酬职务倒挂)对国资国企高质量发展的影响。研究发现:(1)高管薪酬职务倒挂对国企高质量发展具有抑制效应,表现为创新投入减少、产出降低;而选聘年富力强高管、加强高管任职交流则有助于缓解这一抑制效应。(2)这一影响的作用机理是薪酬职务倒挂降低了国企高管的风险承担水平,使企业创新活动意愿降低。(3)国企高管薪酬职务倒挂对企业创新活动的影响存在异质性,这一抑制效应主要体现在地方国有企业、非混合所有制改革企业。本文为理解国企高管薪酬契约提供了新视角,研究结论对国资监管部门设计薪酬激励体系、推动国资国企高质量发展具有重要的实践指导价值。Innovation is an important driving force for high-quality economic development.As an important pillar and backbone of national economic development,state-owned enterprises(SOEs)play an important role in China’s economic development process.Implementing the innovation-oriented national strategy is an important way to achieve high-quality economic development to promote the technological innovation of SOEs that are the main entities of micro-innovation.As the top planner and implementer of the innovation strategy of the company,the behavior of the senior executives directly influences and determines the innovation activities of the firm.Therefore,the establishment of an effective incentive mechanism to stimulate the long-term vision of senior executives has become the key to driving corporate innovation.The senior executives of SOEs have not established market-oriented incentive mechanisms,and the“salary limit”policy of SOEs has caused the phenomenon of executive pay-position upside down(PUD).According to tournament theory and social comparison theory,setting a reasonable pay gap is helpful to improve the enthusiasm of management,and the PUD makes the salary incentive mechanism appear dislocation.However,prior studies mainly focus on how to design the optimal contract,such as salary contract,equity incentive,implicit incentive,to alleviate agency conflicts.They lack in-depth discussion on the phenomenon of the PUD,which is common in SOEs.Based on this,this paper focuses on the following questions:What are the economic consequences of the PUD?Will it affect the high-quality development of SOEs?Answering this question not only helps to improve the understanding of the compensation contract of senior executives in SOEs but also has important practical guiding significance for deepening the reform of SOEs aiming at the high-quality development of SOEs.Using a sample of SOEs over the period from 2007 to 2020,this paper investigates the impact of PUD in SOEs on corporate innovation behavior to reveal the real impac

关 键 词：高管薪酬契约 薪酬职务倒挂 企业创新 国资国企 高质量发展 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F276.1F272.92