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作 者:李维安[1,2] 李鼎 周宁 LI Wei-an;LI Ding;ZHOU Ning(School of Business Administration,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Liaoning,Dalian,116025,China;China Academy of Corporate Governance,Nankai University,Tianjin,300071,China)
机构地区:[1]东北财经大学工商管理学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071
出 处:《经济管理》2025年第1期5-23,共19页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目“突发事件应急社会治理的协同机制研究”(72174096);国家社会科学基金重大项目“新《公司法》下国有企业现代公司治理理论与实践问题研究”(24&ZD084)。
摘 要:环境规制是中国生态文明建设的重要手段,但环境规制能否引导企业充分考虑生态环境可承载性的同时兼顾社会责任和治理责任尚无定论。本文利用2010一2020年中国A股重污染行业上市公司样本,实证考察环境规制对企业绿色治理的作用,并检验了环保压力和代理问题两种影响机制。研究发现:环境规制与企业绿色治理机会主义行为之间呈现出正相关关系。机制检验表明,环境规制增大了企业的环保压力和代理问题。异质性分析显示,环境规制对企业绿色治理机会主义行为的作用只在高媒体关注、低政府与市场的关系、高融资约束和国有企业样本中显著。因此,政府在制定和颁布环境规制政策时,应纳入社会绩效和治理绩效考核,避免部分企业出现“顾此失彼”的绿色治理机会主义行为。本文不仅拓宽绿色治理理论框架,还为环境规制的经济后果研究提供新的视角。Typically,companies prioritize achieving commercial value,assuming governance responsibilities,and then taking on social and environmental responsibilities.However,under strong environmental regulatory pressure,companies may change the order in which they assume responsibilities to various stakeholders.This can lead to some companies failing to balance the interests of diverse stakeholders while fulfilling their environmental responsibilities,resulting in a disconnect between human and natural development and presenting a phenomenon of green governance opportunistic behavior.This phenomenon is essentially an opportunistic behavior by companies in response to external environmental pressures,undermining stakeholders'confidence in green products and environmentally friendly companies,and hindering the achievement of sustainable development.Therefore,does environmental regulation lead to green governance opportunistic behavior?If so,what are the influencing mechanisms?From the perspective of institutional theory,this paper uses a sample of listed companies in heavily polluting industries on China's A-shares from 2010 to 2020 to empirically examine the effect of environmental regulation on green governance opportunistic behavior.In terms of variable measurement,this paper evaluates companies'responsibilities based on their environmental responsibility scores,social responsibility scores,and shareholder responsibility scores,thereby synthesizing a green governance opportunistic behavior variable.Specifically,using industry comparability within the same responsibility scores,the three responsibility scores are converted into three dummy variables,each representing whether the respective responsibility is well-fulfilled.Samples where environmental responsibility is well-fulfilled but social or shareholder responsibilities are poorly fulfilled are defined as green governance opportunistic behavior.This method of variable measurement avoids the issue of inconsistent dimensions and standards among the three responsibility
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