国家审计对央企高管超额薪酬的治理效应——基于共同富裕的研究视角  

Impact of National Audit on Governance Effect of Excess Compensation for Executives in Central State-Owned Enterprises--Based on the Research Perspective of Common Prosperity

作　　者：石威峰 傅绍正 胡国强 SHI Wei-feng;FU Shao-zheng;HU Guo-qiang(School of Accounting,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222;Audit and Control Research Center,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China)

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学会计学院,天津300222 [2]天津财经大学审计与控制研究中心,天津300222

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2025年第2期113-126,共14页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(23BJY110);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72002147);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72202153)。

摘　　要：利用审计署公布的央企集团财务收支审计结果公告,实证考察国家审计对高管超额薪酬的治理作用。研究发现:国家审计通过权力约束效应和信息效应,显著降低被审计央企高管超额薪酬;国家审计的治理效应因企业内外部治理特征存在差异;适时开展审计监督“回头看”能够强化审计监督效果;抑制高管超额薪酬有助于缩小企业内部薪酬差距。研究结论深化了对国家审计治理作用的理解,为国家审计优化企业内部收入分配格局提供微观证据。Based on the announcement of audit results on financial revenue and expenditure of central state-owned enterprise groups published by the National Audit Ofice,this paper empirically examined the governance effect of national audit on addressing excess executive compensation.The results showed that,the compensation-reduction effect of national audit took effect by the power constraint effect and information effect.The governance effect of national audit might vary depending on the internal and external governance characteristics of enterprises.Furthermore,conducting timely"look-back"audit supervision could enhance the effectiveness of audit oversight.In addition,curbing excess executive compensation was conductive to narrowing the internal pay gap within enterprises.The research conclusions contributed to a deeper understanding of the governance role of national audit,and provided micro-level evidence for how national auditing could optimize the internal income distribution structure within enterprises.

关 键 词：国家审计 超额薪酬 共同富裕 权力约束 信息环境 薪酬操纵 正常薪酬 薪酬差距 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]