高职院校教学能力比赛:效用、成本与策略选择  

Teaching Ability Competition in Higher Vocational Colleges:Effectiveness,Cost and Strategy Selection

作　　者：王华珍 WANG Hua-zhen(College of Humanities and Arts,Xianning Vocational and Technical College,Xianning 437100,China)

机构地区：[1]咸宁职业技术学院人文艺术学院,湖北咸宁437100

出　　处：《湖北科技学院学报》2025年第2期74-82,共9页Journal of Hubei University of Science and Technology

基　　金：湖北省教育科学规划课题“市域产教联合体运行机制建设实践与探索——以咸宁市域产教联合体为例”(2024GB418)。

摘　　要：职业院校技能大赛教学能力比赛历经十余载,成果显著,亦有危机。在博弈视域下,政府部门、职业院校和参赛教师,从利己角度出发,选择各自最优策略,最终会形成最坏结果的行为组合,即政府出台缺乏实际支持内容的比赛相关政策,学校简单推动,教师敷衍了事。分析政府和院校、院校之间以及院校和教师间博弈行为逻辑及效用,从政府部门、院校和参赛教师三个层面提出建议,打破最坏行为组合,打造教学能力比赛高质量发展良好生态。The teaching ability competition in vocational skills competition has been going on for more than ten years,with remarkable results as well as crises.From the perspective of the game theory,government departments,vocational schools and participating teachers will choose the best strategies in their self-interest,which will eventually form a behavioral combination with the worst result,that is,the government issues competition-related policies that lack practical support,and the vocational schools simply “push forward” the competition and the teachers just get it over with.The paper analyzes the logic and effectiveness of game behavior between the government and colleges,between colleges and universities,and between colleges and teachers,and puts forward suggestions from three levels:government departments,colleges and universities,and participating teachers,to break the worst behavior combination and promote the high-quality development of teaching ability competition.

关 键 词：教学能力比赛 博弈论 行为组合 高质量 

分 类 号：G71[文化科学—职业技术教育学]