政府规制下供应链企业碳减排演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chain Enterprises Under Government Regulation

作　　者：许海娟 叶春明[1] 李芳[1] XU Hai-juan;YE Chun-ming;LI Fang(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《软科学》2025年第2期107-114,共8页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71840003);上海市哲学社会科学一般项目(2022BGL010)。

摘　　要：在政府规制下,建立考虑上下游供应商和制造商的碳减排演化博弈模型,分析各方策略的演化过程及其演化稳定性。探讨了政府规制措施、低碳生产收益增长率以及“搭便车”行为对企业碳减排策略的影响。结果表明,提高企业原始收益和低碳生产收益增长率有助于实现稳定的碳减排行为;而“搭便车”收益和碳减排成本的增加则削弱了企业减排的积极性;同时,政府规制力度的增强能够有效促进供应链碳减排。Under government regulation,a carbon reduction evolutionary game model that considers upstream and downstream suppliers and manufacturers is established to analyze the evolutionary processes and stability of strategies among all parties.This paper innovatively explores the impacts of government regulatory measures,low-carbon production profit growth rates,and"free-rider"behaviors on corporate carbon reduction strategies.The results indicate that increasing original profits and low-carbon production profit growth rates helps achieve stable carbon reduction behaviors while rising free-rider profits and carbon reduction costs diminish enterprises′willingness to reduce emissions.Additionally,strengthening government regulation effectively promotes carbon reduction in the supply chain.The conclusions provide theoretical references and practical guidance for enterprises in formulating carbon reduction strategies and for government policy-making.

关 键 词：碳减排 政府规制 演化博弈 

分 类 号：X322[环境科学与工程—环境工程] F274[经济管理—企业管理]