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作 者:黄茜 周克明 刘博[3] 姚群 HUANG Qian;ZHOU Keming;LIU Bo;YAO Qun(The Public Affairs Department,West Anhui Health Vocational College,Lu’an,Anhui 237012,China;School of Economics and Management,West Anhui University,Lu’an,Anhui 237012,China;School of Accounting,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu,Anhui 233030,China)
机构地区:[1]皖西卫生职业学院公共学院,安徽六安237012 [2]皖西学院经济与管理学院,安徽六安237012 [3]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233030
出 处:《沧州师范学院学报》2025年第1期83-89,共7页Journal of Cangzhou Normal University
基 金:2021年度安徽省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目“防疫常态背景下医院财务管理创新研究”,编号:SK2021B003;2021年度安徽省教育厅省级质量工程重点项目“人工智能化背景下高水平应用型会计人才培养模式探究”,编号:2021jyxm1642。
摘 要:选取2014-2024年我国A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证分析了上市公司盈余管理对商誉减值的治理效应,并进一步监测加入高管声誉后的调节效应。研究发现:上市公司会出于“大洗澡”动机或“平滑盈余”动机计提商誉减值,而且该盈余管理动机越强烈,越倾向于计提更高比例的商誉减值。此外,进一步研究表明高管声誉并不会显著加剧上市公司商誉减值的“大洗澡”动机,但会显著抑制上市公司商誉减值的“平滑盈余”动机。高管声誉作为职业经理人在经理人市场的一种隐形激励,势必会对上市公司高管行为产生重要影响。从高管声誉的角度进一步揭示上市公司盈余管理对商誉减值的治理效应,为上市公司提高会计信息质量和治理能力提供理论参考。Taking China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2024 as the research sample,this study empirically analyzes the governance effect of earnings management on goodwill impairment and further monitors the moderating effect of executive reputation.The research finds that listed companies recognize goodwill impairment for the purposes of“big bath”motivation or“earnings smoothing”motivation,and the stronger the earnings management motivation,the more likely they are to recognize a higher proportion of goodwill impairment.Furthermore,additional research shows that executive reputation does not significantly exacerbate the“big bath”motivation for goodwill impairment,but it significantly restrains the“earnings smoothing”motivation for goodwill impairment.Executive reputation,as a form of implicit incentive in the manager market for professional managers,is bound to have a significant impact on the behavior of executives in listed companies.Revealing the governance effect of earnings management on goodwill impairment from the perspective of executive reputation can provide theoretical references for listed companies to improve accounting information quality and governance capabilities.
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