客户集中度会影响高管超额在职消费吗?——基于A股上市公司数据的实证研究  

Does Customer Concentration Affect Executive Excessive Perquisites?—An Empirical Study Based on the Data of A-Share Listed Companies

作　　者：池国华[1] 周正义 CHI Guohua;ZHOU Zhengyi(School of Internal Audit,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China;School of Accounting,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学内部审计学院,江苏南京211815 [2]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《吉首大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第1期116-127,共12页Journal of Jishou University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72172061)。

摘　　要：高管超额在职消费是隐性腐败的典型表现,严重损害公司价值。采用2007—2019年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,实证研究客户集中度对高管超额在职消费的影响。结果表明,企业的客户集中度越高,高管超额在职消费的程度越低,并且经过一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。作用机制检验发现,客户集中度增加时,企业信息不对称降低、管理层风险感知增强,进而抑制了高管超额在职消费。异质性分析发现,当客户监督能力和监督意愿较强以及高管面临的股权激励和晋升激励较高时,客户集中度对高管超额在职消费的抑制作用更加明显。经济后果检验揭示,客户集中度抑制了高管超额在职消费,进而降低了代理成本。Executive excessive perquisites are a typical manifestation of implicit corruption,severely damaging company value.This study conducts an empirical investigation on the impact of customer concentration on executive excessive perquisites using the data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2019.The results indicate that the higher the customer concentration of a company,the lower the degree of executive excessive perquisites,and this finding holds after a series of robustness tests.Mechanism tests reveal that when customer concentration increases,corporate information asymmetry decreases and management's risk perception strengthens,thereby suppressing executive excessive perquisites.Heterogeneity analysis shows that when customer supervisory capacity and willingness are strong,and executives face higher equity and promotion incentives,the inhibitory effect of customer concentration on executive excessive perquisites is more pronounced.Economic consequence tests reveal that customer concentration suppresses executive excessive perquisites,thereby reducing agency costs.

关 键 词：客户集中度 高管超额在职消费 利益相关者 管理层风险感知 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]