现象学身体作为情境化理解的具身形式——论海德格尔现象学和当代人工智能研究中的具身问题  

The Phenomenological Body as A Form of Contextual Understanding:On Embodiment in Heidegger’s Phenomenology and Contemporary AI Studies

作　　者：刘环[1] Liu Huan(School of Philosophy,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学哲学学院,杭州310058

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2025年第3期113-122,159,共11页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“发生现象学视野下的意识主体研究”(编号505305-S12301ZJ)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：海德格尔思想中的身体隐匿问题在西方学界一直备受诟病,但《存在与时间》的此在分析却经由德雷福斯等学者的阐释,启发了20世纪人工智能具身研究的发展。这表明海德格尔现象学中暗含了某种不明显的身体观。德雷福斯将海德格尔的“存在理解”解读为前反思的具身意向性,后者是支配人类具身实践的情境化理解,无法被还原为抽象统一的逻辑符号和人工计算机语言,基于此,德雷福斯批驳了人工智能表征主义思想。本文尝试立足于德雷福斯的工作,重构海德格尔的身体阐释:现象学身体不是自然主义视角下物理生物系统的躯体,而是一种前反思性的情境化理解的具身形式。The problem of the invisibility of the body in Heidegger’s philosophy has been much criticised in Western scholarship,but meanwhile the Dasein-analysis in Being and Time has inspired the development of the study of the embodiment of artificial intelligence in the last century through the elaboration of scholars such as Dreyfus.This suggests that there is a certain unobtrusive view of the body implicit in Heidegger’s phenomenology.Based on his reading of Heidegger’s“existential understanding”as pre-reflective embodied intentionality,which is a contextual understanding that governs human embodied practice and is not reducible to an abstract and unified logical symbols and artificial language of computers,Dreyfus refutes the idea of AI representationalism.Grounded in Dreyfus’s work,this paper attempts to reconstruct Heidegger’s interpretation of the body:the phenomenological body is not the body of a physical-biological system in a naturalistic perspective,but an embodied form of pre-reflexive contextual understanding.

关 键 词：现象学身体 存在理解 情境化 框架理论 

分 类 号：B51[哲学宗教—外国哲学]