机构地区:[1]南京大学数字经济与管理学院,215163 [2]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院,100875
出 处:《经济研究》2025年第1期56-73,共18页Economic Research Journal
基 金:国家自然科学基金重大项目(72394391);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72003207)的资助;国家社会科学基金重点项目(22AZD118)与重大项目(18ZDA041)。
摘 要:当产业链上的关键中间品面临外部断供风险时,政府可通过靶向设计协调创新激励机制,引导企业研发核心技术并推动技术产业化,实现产业链安全稳定发展。本文构建包含产业链上下游的创新激励机制框架,研究再造产业链的创新激励政策。首先,针对原型研发阶段的创新激励,考虑创新政策对中间品市场的内生影响,探究政府科技部门在最大化全产业链价值的目标下,对获补企业数量与补贴额度的最优权衡。本文发现在最优机制中,筛选规则呈现“阈值”结构,组合补贴的门槛高于单独补贴;补贴额度受企业预期的中间品市场利润影响,组合补贴下企业获补额度高于单独补贴。其次,针对技术产业化阶段,本文探究了政府产业管理部门对创新激励的最优股权设定,并考察政府对资金回报的敏感性如何影响最优持股比例。进一步探析产业管理部门选择多元资金支持模式时,在股权投资-科技信贷-无偿补贴三者之间做出最优选择的内在机理。在此基础上,分析政府不同职能部门之间创新政策的协调,发现产业管理部门对技术产业化的激励会通过影响技术研发预期收益内生调节科技部门的创新政策设计。最后,本文还探讨了上游技术创新与下游需求培育联动的“推-拉”协同式创新扶持政策设计。本研究结合现实,发展了创新激励理论,并为我国提升产业链韧性和安全水平的制度建设提供了学理依据。Currently,external blockade of key intermediate products may severely affect the downstream industrial chains of certain key industries in China.It is necessary for China's innovation policies to focus on breakthroughs in core technologies of key intermediate products that face potential supply risks and have a larger spillover effect on downstream industries.For this,the government should design a systematic targeted innovation mechanism to select and assist enterprises in breaking through the bottlenecks of key technologies.Facing the complexity of real-world situations,this paper constructs an innovative incentive design analysis framework for reengineering industrial chains.It systematically explores the innovation incentive policy system aimed at the stable development of industrial chains.This primarily includes the competitive innovation subsidy mechanism for upstream enterprises'key technology research and development(R&D),the coordinated design of policies targeting both technological development and industrialization,and coordinated“push-and-pull”policy combining upstream subsidies and downstream cultivation.Firstly,for the prototype R&D stage,the innovation subsidy mechanism needs to take into account the impact of the selection of subsidy targets on the intermediate product market structure and the information asymmetry between governments and enterprises,precisely balancing policy benefits and incentive costs.Secondly,for the situations where there is insufficient intrinsic motivation for prototype development and industrialization of key technologies,in the optimal sequential innovation incentive mechanism system,the decision-making department in the industrialization stage should choose the optimal equity-holding based on the number of participating firms,the government's sensitivity to financial returns,and exogenous limit on equity-holding.The decision-making department in the prototype technology R&D stage should consider the industrial development effects of subsequent innovation support po
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