考虑政府补贴和质量创新的装备制造供应链信息分享策略  

Information Sharing Strategies for Equipment Manufacturing Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidies and Quality Innovation

作　　者：王志华[1] 高鹏[1] 陆玉梅[1] WANG Zhihua;GAO Peng;LU Yumei(School of Management,Jiangsu University of Technology,Changzhou 213001,Jiangsu,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏理工学院管理学院,江苏常州213001

出　　处：《科技和产业》2025年第5期310-317,共8页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2021SJZDA031,2023SJZD024)。

摘　　要：基于数字经济发展及装备制造供应链需求信息不确定特征,在装备制造商质量创新下探讨政府补贴对销售商信息分享策略的影响。建立并求解无信息分享和有信息分享下的供应链价格博弈及质量创新决策模型,并对模型结果进行分析。研究发现,销售商分享乐观的需求一定能激励装备制造商提高产品质量,却未必会同时提升批发价和零售价,且有当政府补贴较高时才有助于提高产品实际需求。装备制造商始终能从信息分享中获利,设计信息补偿机制可提高销售商信息分享的动机,但该机制要求政府补贴力度处于一定范围。政府补贴的增加有助于提升信息分享的消费者剩余价值和社会福利价值。Based on the development of the digital economy and the uncertainty of demand information in the equipment manufacturing supply chain,the impact of government subsidies on the information sharing strategy under the equipment manufacturers quality innovation was explored.The price and quality innovation decision models for non information sharing and information sharing were established and solved,and the model results were analyzed.Results show that retailers sharing optimistic demand can definitely motivate equipment manufacturers to improve product quality,but it may not necessarily increase wholesale and retail prices at the same time.Moreover,it is only when government subsidies are high that it helps to increase the actual demand for products.Equipment manufacturers always benefit from information sharing,and designing an information compensation mechanism can increase the motivation for retailers to share,but this mechanism requires government subsidies to be within a certain range.In addition,the increase in government subsidies helps to enhance the consumer surplus value and social welfare value of information sharing.

关 键 词：装备制造供应链 政府补贴 质量创新 信息分享 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]