“质押新规”能够降低企业的盈余管理吗?  

Can the“New Pledge Rules”reduce corporate earnings management?

作　　者：梁芳凝 庞世明[2] LIANG Fangning;PANG Shiming(Langfang Normal University,Langfang 065000,China;Beijing Union University,Beijing 100101,China)

机构地区：[1]廊坊师范学院,河北廊坊065000 [2]北京联合大学,北京100101

出　　处：《中国软科学》2024年第S1期216-224,共9页China Soft Science

基　　金：廊坊师范学院教改课题项目(K2023-45);北京联合大学科研项目(SK20202305);北京联合大学教育教学研究与改革项目(JJ2022Y048)。

摘　　要：针对“质押新规”这一准自然实验,利用双重差分模型,研究其对企业盈余管理的影响。研究发现:“质押新规”的实施显著降低了企业的真实活动盈余管理和应计盈余管理;质押比例越高的企业,盈余管理下降的程度越大;“质押新规”对盈余管理的抑制作用在非国企、高质押率的企业更为显著,而国企、低质押率的企业则不显著。拓展性研究显示,“质押新规”的实施显著降低公司的市值管理行为。研究结果为优化上市公司信息披露制度、完善公司治理机制以及加强资本市场外部监管环境等方面具有实践意义。This paper examines the impact of the“New Pledge Rules”on corporate earnings management using a difference-in-differences model in a quasi-natural experiment.The research finds that the implementation of the“New Pledge Rules”significantly reduced both real activities earnings management and accrual-based earnings management.Companies with higher pledge ratios showed greater reductions in earnings management.The inhibitory effect of the“New Pledge Rules”on earnings management was more significant in non-state-owned enterprises and companies with high pledge ratios,while remaining insignificant in state-owned enterprises and companies with low pledge ratios.Extended research shows that the implementation of the“New Pledge Rules”significantly reduced companies’market value management behavior.This study has important practical implications for optimizing listed companies’information disclosure systems,improving corporate governance mechanisms,and strengthening external regulatory environments in capital markets.

关 键 词：控股股东 股权质押新规 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]