考虑合同不可见与渠道溢出的多渠道供应链合同选择研究  

Contract Selection Strategy for a Multi-channel Supply Chain Considering Contract Unobservability and Channel Spillover Effect

作　　者：陶毅[1] 杨立钧 王美萍 TAO Yi;YANG Lijun;WANG Meiping(School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangdong,Guangzhou 510520,China)

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2025年第1期169-181,共13页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071050);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2022A1515010541)。

摘　　要：随着电商行业的发展,制造商同时开辟电商渠道与线下渠道的情况愈发普遍,渠道间的竞争也变得更加激烈。在以往的研究中,绝大多数假设供应链成员之间的合同内容对其他成员均公开透明,但这种假设在现实中却不一定成立。在考虑合同不可见性的背景下,构建了由一个制造商和两个电商零售商构成的多渠道供应链,并建立了批发价格合同和两部定价合同下的博弈决策模型,研究合同不可见性和渠道溢出效应对供应链成员合同选择的影响。研究表明:在合同可见时,制造商的最优选择是两部定价合同;在合同不可见时,如果零售商间的竞争程度较大,制造商偏好批发价格合同;对于零售商来说,不管合同是否可见,其在批发价格合同中都能获得更高利润。With the development of the e-commerce industry,it is becoming more common for manufacturers to operate e-commerce channel and offline channel at the same time,and the competition between channels has become more intense.In previous studies,most assumed that the contract contents between supply chain members were observable and transparent to other members,but this assumption was not necessarily valid in reality.In the context of contract unobservability,a multi-channel supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two e-commerce retailers was constructed.And the game decision model under wholesale price contract and two-part tariffs contract was established to study the impact of contract invisibility and channel spillover effects on contract selection of supply chain members.The results show that when the contract is observable,the manufacturer's best choice is two-part tariffs contract.However,if there is a high degree of competition among retailers when the contract is unobservable,manufacturers prefer wholesale price contract.For the retailer,whether the contract is observable or not,it can obtain higher profits in the wholesale price contract.

关 键 词：合同不可见性 合同选择 渠道竞争 两部定价合同 批发价格合同 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]