政府激励模式差异、混合所有制改革与国有/非国有资本的策略选择  

Differences in Government Incentive Models,Mixed Ownership Reform and Strategic Choice of State/Non-state Capital

作　　者：李维安 冯瑞瑞 任广乾[3] 郑敏娜 Li Weian;Feng Ruirui;Ren Guangqian;Zheng Minna(China Academy of Corporate Governance,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;School of Business,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;School of Business,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;School of Economics and management,Hebei University of technology,Tianjin 300401,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [3]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001 [4]河北工业大学经济管理学院,天津300401

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2025年第2期356-368,共13页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72174096);国家社会科学基金重大项目(24&ZD084);国家社会科学基金重点项目(22AGL017);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2024T170248;2023M741072)。

摘　　要：国有企业改革40余年,总结和提炼改革的经验做法,是推动改革进一步纵深发展的前提和基础。本文以国有企业混合所有制改革为研究对象,构建了受政府不同激励模式影响的动态演化博弈模型,以考察政府激励模式差异对混合所有制改革中的国有资本与非国有资本策略选择的影响机制,并运用Matlab进行了数值仿真。研究结果表明:政府“实动”时,成本、股权比例等因素对国有资本和非国有资本的策略选择影响更显著,并且更快趋近于国有资本与非国有资本共同参与的状态。政府“虚动”时,财政补贴、税收优惠等扶持政策对非国有资本的策略选择影响更显著,能够促进非国有资本选择“参与”策略并推动博弈系统向理想状态演化。从政策层面深化国有企业改革,促进国有资本与非国有资本的优势互补、共同发展时,政府应推动激励模式转换,发挥市场机制作用,确保各类产权的有效保护。Over four decades,reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)has accumulated significant experience and practices.Summarizing and learning from these experiences is crucial for further reforms.Previous studies have primarily focused on changes in governance structures at the micro-level,highlighting the impacts of state and non-state capital behaviors.However,less attention has been paid to understanding the underlying causes of these impacts.In fact,government incentives play a key role in shaping the strategic decisions of both state and non-state capital.This study examines mixed-ownership reform in SOEs.We developed a dynamic evolutionary game model influenced by different government incentive models to investigate how variations in these incentives affect the strategic choices of state and non-state capital within the reform process.Using Matlab,we conducted numerical simulations to analyze these effects.The findings indicate that when the government takes concrete actions,factors such as costs and equity ratios significantly influence the strategic choices of both state and non-state capital,leading to faster convergence toward joint participation.Conversely,when the government adopts symbolic actions,measures like fiscal subsidies and tax incentives have a more pronounced impact on the strategic choices of non-state capital.These encourage non-state capital to choose participation,thereby promoting the evolution of the game system toward an optimal state.This paper not only expands the theoretical research on SOEs but also deepens our understanding of the behavior patterns and motivations of various stakeholders in mixed-ownership reform.In the future,to deepen SOEs reform at the policy level and promote complementary advantages and common development between state and non-state capital,the government should facilitate the transition of incentive models and adhere to market-oriented reforms.Additionally,it should ensure the effective protection of all types of property rights.

关 键 词：混合所有制改革 政府激励模式 国有资本 非国有资本 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]