委托代理视角下公立医院医生多任务激励契约设计与仿真分析  

Incentive contract design and simulation analysis for multi-tasking doctors in public hospitals from the perspective of principal-agent theory

作　　者：刘慧[1] 王俏荔[1] 於君 LIU Hui;WANG Qiaoli;YU Jun(School of Humanities and Management,Ningxia Medical University,Yinchuan,Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region,750004,PRC)

机构地区：[1]宁夏医科大学人文与管理学院,宁夏回族自治区银川市750004

出　　处：《中国医院》2025年第4期12-16,共5页Chinese Hospitals

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71964028);宁夏回族自治区社科规划项目(24NXBSH05);宁夏医科大学校级重点科研项目(XZ2022012)。

摘　　要：目的:研究双重委托代理下,政府激励公立医院医生完成经济和公益两项任务的最优契约形式,为公立医院的激励机制设计提供建议。方法:构建双重多任务委托代理模型,并进行模型分析和数理推导。结果:公立医院对医生公益性任务的激励强度与医生两项任务努力成本系数、政府对公立医院创造社会效益的补贴系数正相关,与医生两项任务相关性系数负相关;医生经济性任务的激励强度,与政府对公立医院创造社会效益的补贴系数负相关;政府对公立医院创造社会效益的补贴强度,与公益性任务方差正相关,与经济性任务方差负相关。结论:政府应优化医生公益性任务激励保障机制,完善公立医院薪酬考核制度,健全公立医院财政补贴机制。Objective:To study the optimal contract form under a dual principal-agent framework,in which the government incentivizes public hospital doctors to fulfill both economic and public welfare tasks,and to provide recommendations for designing incentive mechanisms in public hospitals.Methods:A dual multi-task principal-agent model was constructed,followed by model analysis and mathematical derivation.Results:The intensity of public welfare task incentives in public hospitals was positively correlated with the effort cost coefficients of doctors for both tasks and the government’s subsidy coefficient for public hospitals'social benefits,while negatively correlated with the correlation coefficient between the two tasks.The intensity of economic task incentives for doctors was negatively correlated with the government’s subsidy coefficient for public hospitals'social benefits.Furthermore,the intensity of government subsidies for public hospitals'social benefits was positively correlated with the variance of public welfare tasks and negatively correlated with the variance of economic tasks.Conclusion:The government should optimize the incentive and safeguard mechanisms for public welfare tasks,improve the salary evaluation system for public hospitals,and establish a sound financial subsidy mechanism for public hospitals.

关 键 词：委托代理理论 激励机制 政府激励 公立医院 

分 类 号：R197[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]