CEO强制变更对盈余管理的溢出效应  

Spillover Effect of CEO Forced Turnover on Earnings Management

作　　者：董文昊 刘春林[1] DONG Wenhao;LIU Chunlin(Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093)

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,南京210093

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2025年第3期128-144,共17页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“制度抗拒与代际断裂:新生代高管对企业社会责任行为的影响研究”(72072085)。

摘　　要：公司高管变更是约束经理人行为的重要治理机制,且具有行业溢出效应。本文以2009—2022年A股上市公司为研究样本,探究同行首席执行官(CEO)强制变更对焦点公司盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果显示,不同于西方国家,中国情境下同行CEO强制变更会提升焦点公司的盈余管理程度。异质性分析结果表明,市场化程度、长期机构投资者持股及CEO的金融背景都可以抑制同行CEO强制变更对焦点公司盈余管理的促进作用;相反,这一促进作用在具有海外背景的CEO群体中更加明显。进一步地,同行CEO的强制变更仅对向上盈余管理有提升作用,这验证了焦点公司CEO职业安全感缺失下的印象管理动机。本文深入探讨了中国当前公司治理实践中CEO强制变更的溢出效应,为更好地推动上市公司高质量信息披露提供了新的启示。CEO forced turnover serves as an important mechanism for regulating top managers’behaviors and reducing agency problems.As research on the spillover effects of CEO forced turnover extends from developed to developing countries,this paper uncovers a new explanatory mechanism for CEOs’impression management behaviors under conditions of job insecurity.Using a sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2022,this paper empirically examines the spillover effects of CEO forced turnover on earnings management behaviors.The findings reveal that peer CEO forced turnover can increase earnings management in focal firms.Heterogeneity tests indicate that higher marketization levels,long-term institutional ownership,and CEOs with financial backgrounds mitigate the positive correlation between peer CEO forced turnover and earnings management in focal firms.Further analysis demonstrates that peer CEO forced turnover is significantly associated only with upward earnings management in focal firms.In addition,it also discusses the CEOs’choice of earnings management methods,and the empirical results show that managers tend to refrain from real earnings management to change the company’s current business decisions,in order to prevent adverse impacts on future performance.Finally,this paper finds that the stimulative effect of peer CEO forced turnover on earnings management in the focal firms is significant but limited to the short term.Moreover,although the focal firms’CEOs may resort to earnings management to enhance their job security,this strategy does not appear to reduce the likelihood of forced turnover in the subsequent year.This paper makes three key contributions.First,it extends the research on the industry spillover effects of CEO forced turnover from developed to developing countries and proposes that under China’s institutional context,CEO forced turnover does not exert a disciplinary effect on other firms within the industry.Instead,it stimulates the earnings management motives o

关 键 词：CEO强制变更 盈余管理 印象管理 公司治理 CEO特征 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]