言浮于行,实以治之:高管环保背景与企业“漂绿”  

Empty Words Without Action, Governance through Substance:Executives Environmental Background and Corporate “Greenwashing”

作　　者：牛枫 罗智超 邱保印 NIU Feng;LUO Zhichao;QIU Baoyin(School of Accounting,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2025年第2期55-66,共12页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(24BJY203)。

摘　　要：企业“漂绿”已经成为我国实现“双碳”目标和高质量发展的重大阻碍。基于高阶理论,以2011—2022年中国A股上市企业为研究样本,探讨高管环保背景对企业“漂绿”的影响。实证结果显示,高管环保背景能够有效抑制企业“漂绿”,且该结论经过一系列检验后仍然保持不变。机制检验表明,拥有环保背景的高管通过增强企业环保意识、提升企业环境合法性和减少企业环境成本抑制企业“漂绿”;异质性分析发现,在自愿披露环境信息的企业、重污染企业和位于内陆城市的企业中,高管环保背景对于企业“漂绿”的抑制作用更为显著。Corporate“greenwashing”has become a significant barrier to achieving China’s“dual carbon”goals and high-quality development.Based on upper echelons theory,this study examines the impact of executives environmental backgrounds on corporate“greenwashing”,focusing on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2022.The empirical results indicate that executives with environmental backgrounds can effectively curb corporate“greenwashing”,and this conclusion remains robust after a series of tests.Mechanism tests reveal that executives with environmental backgrounds inhibit corporate“greenwashing”by enhancing corporate environmental awareness,improving corporate environmental legitimacy,and reducing corporate environmental costs.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of executives environmental backgrounds on corporate“greenwashing”is more pronounced in companies that voluntarily disclose environmental information,heavily polluted companies,and companies located in inland cities.

关 键 词：高管环保背景 漂绿 环境信息披露 企业环保意识 环境合法性 环境成本 

分 类 号：F279.23[经济管理—企业管理]