数字金融发展与年报预约披露延迟  

The Development of Digital Finance And Delayon Scheduled Annual Report Disclosure

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:周兆斌 ZHOU Zhaobin(Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences,Beijing 100142,China)

机构地区:[1]中国财政科学研究院,北京100142

出  处:《南京审计大学学报》2025年第2期77-86,共10页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

摘  要:企业及时披露会计信息有助于促进投资者保护并维护市场稳定运行。选取2011—2021年A股上市公司作为研究样本,探讨了数字金融发展对年报预约披露延迟的影响。研究发现,数字金融能够减少年报预约披露延迟。机制检验结果表明,数字金融通过抑制高管违规发挥“监督效应”、通过缓解企业融资约束发挥“资金支持效应”,从而减少企业年报预约披露延迟。进一步研究结果表明,数字金融“补足”企业文化、外部监管“驱动”数字金融治理功能并且数字金融对审计妥协行为发挥着监督作用,即在商帮文化水平低、诚信文化水平低、证监会监管水平高、金融市场监管水平高、客户重要性水平高的企业中,数字金融对年报预约披露延迟的抑制作用更为显著。Timely disclosure of accounting information is helpful to promote investor protection and maintain the stable operation of the market.Taking A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2021 as research samples,this paper discusses the impact of the development of digital finance on the delay on scheduled annual report disclosure.It finds that the development of digital finance can reduce delays on scheduled annual report disclosure.The mechanism test results show that digital finance exerts a“supervision effect”by restraining executive violations and a“financial support effect”by easing corporate financing constraints,thereby reducing delays on scheduled annual report disclosure.Further research shows that digital finance“complements”corporate culture,external supervision“drives”digital financial governance function,and digital finance plays a supervisory role in audit compromise behavior,that is,in enterprises with low level of business culture,low level of integrity culture,high level of CSRC supervision,high level of financial market supervision,and high level of customer importance,digital finance has a more significant inhibitory effect on the delay on scheduled annual report disclosure.

关 键 词:数字金融 年报预约披露延迟 高管违规 融资约束 企业文化 外部监管 客户重要性 

分 类 号:F231[经济管理—会计学] F832.5[经济管理—国民经济] F239

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象